An election reform platform for Libertarian candidates in 2008 
	D. Frank Robinson 
	Copyright 2007
	
	Executive Summary

Candidates for state and federal office, especially candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives, can confront a dysfunctional legislative branch as the primary cause of a runaway Presidency. The  most dysfunctional branch of Congress is the U.S. House of Representatives. The House is a failure because it has become disconnected from its Constitutional structure as the voice of the general population in the affairs of state. 

To restore the House to its place in a Constitutional structure it must be enlarged in size. It can be enlarged in size by ratification of an amendment which has been pending since 1787 when joined by the ratification of a companion amendment which corrects a drafting error in the original language of the first amendment. 

In addition the other major contributing factors to legislative dysfunction can also be addressed. 

Redistricting of legislative districts by using a mathematical algorithm - the shortest splitline - to establish default geographical districts for representation. This would establish equal population constituencies within a jurisdiction without 'bipartisan' interventions. 

The recognition of candidates and voters as equally free agents. A candidate can seek only one office and a voter can voter only once for candidate. But candidates for the House can choose which Congressional district to seek election. Voters should also be able to choose which Congressional district in a state to cast their one vote for a Representative by effectively swapping the opportunity to vote with another voter in another district. 

The recognition that citizen-candidates are the sole authority for establishing political parties by free association. There are therefore no constitutional grounds for prior restraint by the government on the formation of political parties. No ballot access laws, no petitions, no franchise taxes (fees), and no state sponsored political party cartels with 'seeded' positions on the ballot. 

Strict protection for the anonymity of the voter's ballot and full public access to verify the counting procedures for those anonymous ballots. 

Similarly, strict protection for the anonymity of the citizen's political contributions to candidates and full public disclosure of candidate spending of those anonymous donations. 

	This program for election reform would have cascading consequences for Presidential and Senatorial elections which are also beneficial, but the integrity of the institution of the U.S. House of Representatives is the root for any claim of popular legitimacy for the entire federal state. 

“Electoral reform projects seek to change the way that public desires are reflected in elections through electoral systems. Reform projects can include measures designed to reform political parties (typically changes to election laws); to redefine citizen eligibility to vote; to change the way candidates or political parties gain ballot access; to alter the methods for defining electoral constituencies and election district borders; to design or implement new ballot systems or new voting equipment; to tighten scrutineering (by the parties or other observers); to ensure safety of citizens voting; to limit the influence of bribes, coercion, and conflicts of interest; to regulate financing to candidates; to encourage participation and to provide alternative vote-counting procedures altering the rules by which the winners of legislature and executive offices are determined, e.g., runoff voting, instant runoff voting, approval voting, citizen initiatives and referenda, recall elections, or proportional representation .”

Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_reform (05/05/2007)

	“Democracy is, at its essence, self-rule. It is the way in which free people govern themselves. But in societies in which large populations are distributed over great distances, town meetings are impractical as a means of making policy decisions on a national scale. In the modern age, when those policy decisions often involve matters of great complexity, public referenda, even at the state level, may be similarly impractical. Thus, democratic societies have developed systems of representative government, in which citizens choose from among their neighbors those men and women who will make decisions for them. How well that system of indirect democracy works, and whether or not its decisions are considered legitimate, depends, ultimately, on the validity of the elections by means of which representatives – Presidents, members of Congress, governors, mayors, state legislators – are chosen. 
	Every election season produces a rash of complaints that something is just not working right. A President may take office despite the fact that the majority of Americans preferred somebody else (it has happened three times in this country’s history). Turnout may be very low. Citizens may be considered ineligible to vote because they have lived too short a time in a particular community. The polls may close before workers can get back to their home precincts from their jobs, often many miles distant. Elections may favor people with the contacts (or the personal resources) to outspend opponents by huge margins, and they may serve to advance the policy preferences of people with enough money to make substantial contributions to candidates who will advance their interests. 
	Or perhaps none of these criticisms is valid. The task force will consider the full range of criticisms -- and proposed improvements – in the American election system. Its recommendations will be in the form of a report to organizations involved in the study of electoral reform, (including the constitution project’s election reform initiative and the center for voting and democracy), as well as to the Congressional leadership.” 

Mickey Edwards served as a member of Congress for 16 years. He has been a columnist for the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune, and a regular weekly commentator on National Public Radio’s “All Things Considered”. He taught for 11 years at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is currently with the Aspen Institute. 

***
The author of this paper is not connected with The Constitution Project. The ideas presented are entirely independent. We argue that these are the essential components of election reform: 

First, Voters must be recognized as free agents. Within the framework of federal system the voter in each state must be as recognized as legally equal to a voter in all other states. This means especially that a vote in each Congressional district must be as nearly equal as practical to the vote in any other Congressional district within each state and the districts in other all states. The populations of Congressional districts must be equal in all districts apportioned to all states. 

Second, to secure this equality the number of Representatives must be increased after each census to secure nearly identical sized populations in the districts. This will result in districts with smaller populations for Representatives. Fixing of the size of the House at 435 members must be ended and the size of the House significantly enlarged by a factor of 4 or 5 or greater.

Third, candidates must be recognized as free agents, and because there is never equality in the characteristics of candidates just as there is never equality in the characteristics of populations in all districts. Within each state the Congressional candidates are free to choose the district in which to seek election; voters in these districts must also have the  freedom within a state to choose which Congressional district they will cast their vote for Representative. Therefore, the procedures to enable  the voter to opt out of any Congressional district to which he has been assigned by territorial boundaries must be implemented. Voters in districts of equal populations must be enabled to freely cross arbitrary boundaries to exercise their right to vote for a member of Congress from their state. The reciprocity of this procedure would allow minorities the opportunity effectively nullify discriminatory gerrymandering without undermining the principle of one person, one vote. 

The best possible security of the voter's secret ballot and the integrity of ballot counting form the base concepts translating equal votes into effective decisions. The paper ballot is indispensable until technology can produced an effective equivalent with lower cost. 

Free access to the ballot for candidates makes a ballot worth using for the voter. If the ballot choices are limited, the count is rigged before any ballot is cast. There must be no prior restraints on any constitutionally qualified person placing their name on the ballot in any election. No fees, no petitions. 

Political party labels for candidates appearing on the ballot must governed by the principle of free association among the candidates. Only candidates appearing on a ballot, if they wish, may choose the terms of political association among themselves as a 'party' with a common label on a ballot. Government has no legitimate authority to establish cartel franchises for political parties by, in effect,  licensing party labels. 

The present regime of financing political campaigns must scrapped. The right of citizens to fund political speech must be unlimited in amount given, and unrestricted in the persons to whom contributions are made. The free flow of financing can be consistent with the principles in the balloting process described above can be achieved by permitting 'voting with dollars' using procedures very much like secret ballot voting. The financing of political candidates must be exclusively anonymous and unrestricted in amounts given and candidates unrestricted in how those funds are spent. 

These components fit together to form a electoral reform package for Libertarian Party candidates or any other candidates who respect the authority of voters. 

How can 'traction' be found to place this reform program to the public? 

By campaigning in real elections for state and federal offices for ratification of an already pending Constitutional amendment by the legislatures of the states.  By joining in a coalition of groups across the nation regardless of whether they may agree with all points in the essentially libertarian reform agenda. Where one group does not run a candidate, the voters of the other groups will pledge to vote for a candidate who actively campaigns for the reform agenda. 

Why we need to ratify the 28th and 29th Amendments is discussed in the following essay. 

Authoritarianism by the Numbers: A really inconvenient truth! 
D. Frank Robinson
Copyright 2007

The original proportional apportionment formula for the House of Representatives is in the Constitution's clause 3 of Article One : 

“ [Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons]. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut, five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.” (Emphasis added). 

At the time of the ratifying conventions many delegates found this provision highly objectionable. A more acceptable formula was presented to resolve the objections. 

The purpose of this essay is to advance the merits of the only remaining not yet ratified Constitutional Amendment of the original twelve proposed by the first Congress. The amendment concerns the number of Representatives for apportionment of among the States and increasing the size of the U.S. House of Representatives to establish a proportionality closer to that intended by the ratifying delegates and the First Congress.  
The merits will be evaluated using the criteria recommended by The Constitution Project in 1997. The pending amendment states:
 After the first enumeration required by the first Article of the Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after which, the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor less than one Representative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of Representatives shall amount to two hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall  not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.  (Emphasis added.)   

(1.) Does the proposed amendment address matters that are of more than immediate concern and that are likely to be recognized as abiding importance by subsequent generations? 
 The Constitution clearly indicates the importance of a minimal proportionality between the Representative and the number of constituents. The original ratio was 1:30,000.  In the state convention debates to secure ratification of the Constitution objections were raised that (1) there was insufficient provision to ensure that as the nation grew, the size of the House would continue to be large enough to give the people's Representatives their due influence in the national government and (2) that the districts would remain small enough in population to give the people due influence upon the Representatives. To overcome these objections and secure ratification, promises were made that the first Congress would draft an amendment to make clear that the number of Representatives would increase with the general population and the districts would not become excessively large in population. To fulfill those promises the first of twelve amendments to overcome the many objections was drafted to address the apportionment of Representatives. The compromise ratio was 1:50,000.  The ten ratified amendments are known as the Bill of Rights. The original second amendment was ratified in 1992,  203 years after it was drafted and is now designated as the 27th Amendment.

 What could be the 28th Amendment was proposed by the first Congress on September 25, 1789, as the first First Amendment. It addressed one of the arguments most frequently advanced against the Constitution. Historians generally agree that the architect of this amendment was almost certainly James Madison serving as a  Representative, but there were other fingerprints on it as we shall see. 

The authors easily agreed that no matter the population every state shall have one Representative. Then they negotiated a rule which set a minimum population of 30,000 for any additional Representatives for any state in the Constitution. The population number is arbitrary, but it was an agreeable bargain for them and it's still a provision of the Constitution. 
 
 What the authors never intended was to set a fixed maximum number of Representatives.  Even though the  'first' amendment was intended to make this explicit it was left unratified, but it was not seen as a serious problem.  The importance of representational proportionality was acknowledged in practice for a century thereafter because the membership of the House was increased repeatedly after each Census - until the beginning of the 20th century. Then Congress stopped increasing the number of Representatives. By  deliberate inaction they guaranteed that the population 'served' by every Representative would increase – less representation with more taxation. The authors carefully measured compromise was reversed into a progressively more authoritarian blend by diluting representation more and more. Just what the ratifying delegates had anticipated and denounced. Because the apportionment amendment was never ratified, no subsequent Congress needed confront the issue by proposing an amendment to repeal it. Why did the Congress at that time want to abandon any proportional restraint? How did all subsequent  Congresses get away with it?  Is it time to force the Congress to confront what they have done? 

 In the early 20th century rural Congressmen in southern states became jealous of losing power to urban northern states. The newly arrived immigrants were settling in the Northern urban areas and many Southerners, both black and white, were also emigrating north and west. Unable to build a “Berlin Wall” around the South, they simply blocked apportionment and stopped enlarging the size of the House. In fact, after the Census of 1920 the Congress refused to reapportion themselves at all!  The provisions of the Constitution became their “inconvenient truth.” And they got away with it. And all of their successors of both traditional parties have gotten away with it again and again and again. They did not simply refuse to reapportion.  They refused to reapportion with a larger House of Representatives  Just another of America's dirty little open political secrets – just look at the numbers.  It is indeed an inconvenient truth for them and an oppressive truth for all of us.  (Chart to be inserted)

 The language of this original amendment indicates an intent to assure the people that the size of the House of Representatives would increase from one Representative per 30,000 population up one Representative per 40,000, then to one Representative per fifty thousand population thereafter and the size of the House could never be reduced below two hundred members. But the text of the amendment as it stands, if ratified today as the 28th   , would merely allow, but not require, the U.S. House of Representatives be expanded so that it is composed of as many as one Representative per fifty thousand population maximum and two hundred Representatives minimum. It would change nothing in the composition of a House of 435 member with constituency-districts over 650,000.

The present size of the U.S. House has been fixed at 435 since 1910. The population has tripled since the 1910 Census. The average population of a House district after the 2000 Census is about 650,000  – thirteen fold the size prescribed in the pending amendment. Even a return to the proportionality of 1910 would be a significant liberalization of representation; there would be at least 1305 Representatives. This is not a literal  violation of the amendment. But it does raise the question: What was the point of the amendment anyway? Was it just to raise the minimum ratio of population for representation from 1:30,000 to 1:50,000? Was there a widespread fear that representatives faced a scarcity of constituents? Were Madison and his contemporaries in Congress silly, incompetent or devious? 

Occasionally, a few pundits have suggested that enlarging the U.S. House of Representatives should be seriously considered. Almost no one in the hired media has had anything to say about democratizing the House, no documentaries on PBS,  nor have the public policy think tanks, nor academia,  nor 'citizen advocacy' groups taken up the challenge. A century has passed with scarcely a peep from the political elites. 

Had the apportionment amendment been drafted as intended and ratified at any time before the 2000 census, it would have permitted the U.S. House of Representatives today to be composed of as many as  5628  Representatives each with a constituency-district population of 50,004, but no more than that ratio.  Also by way of examples, the State of Oklahoma could have had sixty-nine members in the House and Wyoming just ten. Under the existing scheme of a fixed 385 apportioned Representatives Oklahoma has five Representatives and Wyoming has one. The Wyoming Representative has 495,304 constituents. Each Oklahoma Representative has nearly 691,000 constituents. A 7 to 5 ratio is not exactly one person, one vote. It blatantly not equal proportionality. 

It is not necessary to implicate the possible relationship between the ratification of the16th Amendment and the end to proportionality in representation by no longer increasing the size of the House every ten years. It is not necessary, but it could be inferred from the circumstances. 

While a House of 5628 Representatives may seem preposterous, isn't a House of 435 Representatives for a population of 300 million also preposterous?  The question for Americans today is what number between 435 and 5628 is most acceptable to the people?  Almost no one seems to want to seek an answer. It is nevertheless a legitimate and open constitutional question. It should be settled before the next apportionment after the 2010 Census!  One could take a half-a-loaf position that 2077 would be a moderate compromise (5628-435/2). One could, but one would need not be constrained by the Constitution from seeking a three-quarter loaf or the whole enchilada.  

 Unfortunately, ratification of the pending amendment as the 28th  by itself will not resolve the issue of a more just proportionality for representation. The amendment was drafted with a defect in its language.
 Ratification of the apportionment amendment would make sense only if were adopted with a companion amendment, the 29th, to heal the probably intentional sabotage of the language in the 28th.  

The intent was clearly to establish the eventual maximum population size for a Congressional district of 50,000. This would assure that the size of the House of Representatives would continue to increase with the population and could never be arbitrarily capped in size to entrench a class or faction in the House – without another Constitutional amendment to alter the proportionality. The objection of the opponents to Constitution was never that the size of  a congressional constituency might become too small or the size of the House might become too large. Or at least that the size of the House membership might become too large in the lifetime of the next few generations. The fear among many people was that the House would become too small and the constituencies too large. The amendment also shows the drafting error, which was probably deliberate, effectively nullified the only plausible  purpose of the amendment – too keep the size of the House continually increasing by fixing the maximum proportion between constituents and Representatives. In the amendment's last clause the phrase “nor less than”, which would have been consistent, was apparently altered in a conference committee by a Senator to “nor more than.”  

Why do some scholars make this claim? By simply reading the whole amendment in the context of its historic avowed purpose and logic. Given a population of a determinant number, the relationship between the size of a constituent-district is inverse to the number of Representatives apportioned to all districts. Conversely, the number of Representatives apportioned to the whole population is inverse to the population of  each constituent-district. If the population of the constituent-districts is allowed to float upward, fewer Representatives need to be apportioned. Or, the more Representatives that are apportioned, the lower the constituent-district population ratio will be for each Representative. One need only inspect the actual historical numbers to see the relationship until 1910.    

Every clause modifying the absolute number of Representatives says “not less than.” The phrase in the clauses of “not less than” sets an absolute minimum on the number of Representatives in the House twice, but no maximum. Every clause modifying the proportion of constituents to Representatives says “nor less than.”  However, the last clause modifying the proportion of constituents to Representatives reverses the meaning by saying “nor more than.”  The phrase in the last clause of  “nor more than” sets a minimum on the number of constituents in proportion to the number of Representatives;  this means a maximum on the number of  Representatives is permissible so long as the ratio of constituents exceeds 50,000 to one Representatives  But the minimum number of Representatives had already been set at 200 in the previous clause. Why would the minimum be set redundantly? The result is to create a graphical 'hockey stick' which reverses original construction and a century of practice. Absurd and curious.

As originally drafted, this defect in the provision would create a 'paradox' if the total population declined below two hundred (the minimum number of Representatives) times 50,000 (the minimum number of constituents per Representatives) or ten million in which case any apportionment would be in violation of the provision. 

Actually, the case for paradox is worse than that. Every state must have one Representative regardless of population. The Constitution provides no guidance about the status of statehood if the population falls so low as to approach zero in a state. Presumably, if there are enough people to fill the required offices all is well. But if the House must have two hundred Representatives and each state must have one Representative, then cannot be more than two hundred states - ever. That does seem ample however. Today, we have 50 states. After deducting one for each state, there must be at least 150 seats for apportionment to obtain a minimum of 200 Representatives required in the pending amendment. At the same time there must be at least 50,000 people for each Representative. One hundred fifty times 50,000 = 7,500,000. Suppose 7 million people chose to live in one state and only 500,000 wanted to live in the other 49 states? Hopefully we shall never have face that situation. But if we did, the Constitution could be amended to restore some proportionality without resorting to forcible deannexation. What is the point of this thought exercise? To demonstrate that fixing the size of the U. S. House of Representatives to any absolute maximum or minimum number is irrational. 

Is it also irrational to fix the proportion of constituents to Representatives? Or, considering the question from another perspective, is it rational (non-arbitrary) to fix the size of the population in order to have a House of Representatives with a 'workable' number of members? If the size of the population doesn't matter, why not reduce the size of the House to just fifty members – one for each state. Wouldn't that still be democratic?  If the fundamental objective is to have the size of the House small enough for them to get along with whatever the program may be, then the fewer the better. 

The historical evidence indicates that the size of the House of Representatives was fixed at 435 just when the population was growing in ways that threatened the interests of those who felt more entitled to their offices than any commitment to a principle of proportionality between constituents and the Representative. After all it only a mere custom of only a century's practice. Democratic elements are expendable when it is inexpedient for the few.  

The authors of Constitutional amendments in the First Congress were neither stupid nor inattentive. But supposing that this defect in the apportionment amendment was a mistake that just slipped by, why wasn't a corrected Amendment immediately resubmitted for ratification?  

Possibly because after ten of the twelve amendments were ratified the political pressure was off the federalist-centralist elements to negotiate a more democratic Congress. Thereafter, the size of the House became a matter of custom not Constitutional law. Customs change it becomes expedient. By the time of the early 20th century expediency finally trumped mere custom. Today, the reverse of the original intent has been elevated to legislation. The current law fixing a maximum size on the House of Representatives reveals how little trust can be placed in mere custom to protect the people's interest. 

Or, why at the climax of progressive democratic zeal in the 1930s wasn't an amendment submitted to recover proportionality?  Quite likely because Jim Crow in the South and anti-immigrant bias in the North were allied against it. 

Or, why in the 1990s, when the 27th Amendment was adopted from the same original basket of twelve wasn't an amendment submitted? In this case the answer is not at all clear yet. It may have been simple lethargy or inertia. 

 Should 21st  century Americans now attempt to ratify a 28th  Amendment with the 'improvised explosive device' embedded in the last clause?  I think we should. The antique IED can be disarmed with a  short 29th Amendment. Besides the Congress has lost its credibility in getting the job done on their own initiative. They must now be driven by a population of defrauded voters. 

The language in the last clause consistent with the intended purpose would read this way: 
“After the first enumeration required by the first Article of the Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after which, the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor less than one Representative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of Representatives shall amount to two hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor more than nor less than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.  

But the original language of an amendment pending ratification cannot be changed. It can be partially repealed with language in another amendment which is ratified to be effective after the ratification of the first. A companion amendment to correct the flaw is necessary.  A companion amendment could take effect if, and only if, the primary amendment took effect. This is not novel. Many amendments in the past have done exactly that. The language of those amendments is contingent upon the previous language which they are modifying. One amendment is ratified and another amendment is ratified to unratify the previous one – in whole or in part. 
Of course, a companion 29th amendment could also have other clauses concerning the principle of proportionality in apportioning Representatives. The companion amendment would have to go through all the requirements to be placed before the states for ratification. But the 28th Amendment could still continue through the ratification process until the 29th was submitted. But it need not be ratified by the three-fourths of the states and become effective before the 29th is submitted for ratification. The 28th  could linger just a few states short of  ratification until the 29th was available for ratification. The 29th could then quickly move to 'catch up' with the 28th. Then the 28th could be ratified on one day and the 29th on the next day. The political result would be to make them effective as if they were one amendment.  The practical implementation would not take place until the elections after the next decennial census (2012?). 
Perhaps all the 'teeming masses' proclaiming their devotion to the spirit and letter of Constitution might welcome this opportunity to revisit the work of the founding generation and put a 21st century 'software patch' on the Constitutional code base.  I think the original idea was that the Constitution is an open source project to which anyone can contribute. 

( 2.)  Does the proposed amendment make our system more politically responsive or protect individual rights?   A campaign for ratification of the 28th Amendment could initiate a spirited national debate on a number of issues related to representation and elections. Furthermore, a companion amendment which simply corrects the last clause could be ratified in tandem with the 28th Amendment as the 29th Amendment.  There is no other Constitutional way to correct the original defective language in the pending 28th Amendment. The two amendments could take effect almost concurrently with the 29th contingent on the ratification of the 28th.  A larger House of Representatives with smaller constituencies would open greater access by the public to the Congress. The closer to the Census, the better for ratification. The larger the number of constituent-districts, the greater the opportunity for a more diverse and proportionally representative Congress. 

( 3.) Are there significant practical or legal obstacles to the achievement of the objectives of the proposed amendment by other means?   There would appear to be fewer practical obstacles to enlarging the number of Representatives with the capabilities of existing technology than have been encountered in trying to convert the entire electorate to electronic voting. Legal obstacles to ratification would almost certainly emerge from opponents. The merits of those alleged obstacles might well have to be litigated. That is simply part of the process. 

( 4.) Is the proposed amendment consistent with related constitutional doctrine that the amendment leaves intact?   Congressional hearings to draft the 29th Amendment would implicate the work of the First Congress in drafting the pending 28th Amendment. These issues would no doubt be addressed in drafting the provisions of the 29th.  Enlarging the size of the U.S. House of Representatives would tend to mitigate issues surrounding the 'fairness' of re-districting. More districts means more options for boundaries acceptable to all parties. 

( 5.) Does the amendment embody enforceable, and not merely aspirational standards?   If the provisioning of 435 seats is enforceable, the provisioning of perhaps 1776 seats should also be enforceable. It would not necessarily thwart the aspirations of incumbent congresspersons to be re-elected. There would be plenty of seats to accommodate them and none of them would be forced to run against one another. The number of seats would increase for every state.   

( 6.) Have proponents of the proposed amendment attempted to think though...ways in which the amendment would interact with other constitutional provisions and principles?   Yes. 

( 7.) Has there been full and fair debate on the merits of the proposed amendment?  No. Not yet. That's the problem before us. Shall the people confront the incumbent Congress?  It is notable that resolutions were introduced in the 107th, 108th and 109th Congresses to appoint a commission to make recommendations on “the appropriate size of membership of the House of Representatives.” No action has been taken. We must conclude that since the Congress does not want the issue even studied and discussed, it entirely appropriate for citizens to independently study and discuss this issue in the context of the pending apportionment amendment to the U. S. Constitution. This amendment presents a viable opportunity for a 'velvet revolution' -  revolution under the Constitution. 

( 8.) Has Congress provided for a nonextendable deadline for ratification by the states so as to ensure that there is a contemporaneous consensus by Congress and the states that the proposed amendment is desirable?  I find guideline Eight most objectionable. This concern is not really applicable to the pending 28th amendment. However, it does raise an interesting issue. Where is the constitutional authority for the Congress to place any limit on the time for consideration of proposed amendments by the states?  Any such limit is over-reaching by the Congress and a violation of the rights of the states. The First Congress did not do it. The 27th Amendment has been adopted legitimately and there is no reason why this pending amendment, or any other proposed amendment for that matter, should carry an infirmity which previous amendments have not carried.  In Coleman v. Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the ratification of a constitutional amendment is “political” in nature and that Congress has the power via Article V of the U.S. Constitution to modify the mode of an amendment's ratification. SCOTUS got it wrong again. Nevertheless, a nonextendable deadline clause of seven years in the proposed 29th Amendment would have no detrimental effect on the 28th.  The pending amendment cannot be withdrawn from the states. If it does not become the 28th Amendment, it could be the 29th or the 30th Amendment. 

Parenthetically, it seems entirely appropriate to consider another amendment that would clearly prohibit the Congress from planting timed improvised  explosive devices (time limits for ratification) in Constitutional amendments, but that is another matter for another time.  

It appears reasonable to conclude that the pending 28th amendment, which was intended to assure both (a) proportionality between representation and constituency and (b) perpetual enlargements of the U. S. House of Representatives, meets at least six of the eight criteria suggested by the Constitution Project. Or phrasing it another way, only six of the eight criteria are applicable to this amendment. It is therefore not really necessary to fully engage the last two criteria in this instance. If the argument on the first six criteria is sufficient for the 28th Amendment, then it is also sufficient for the correcting companion 29th Amendment - with or without a deadline provision is a matter of lesser controversy in this particular case. 

The world's largest parliamentary or legislative body is the:  ,   with 2,937 members. China has a population of about 1.3 billion. There is one member in their Congress for every 434,000 people. The U. S. House of Representatives has 435 members. Each member of the U.S. House represents an average of 647,000 people. That's one and a half as many as the as the average Chinese representative. To have the same ratio of members as China the U. S. House would need to add 213 members. Of course this comparison is not necessarily relevant for U. S. citizens. Chinese citizens have very little influence on their rigidly authoritarian government. The relevant issue for Americans is whether we have more influence on this government or whether the government  merely better at disguising its authoritarian character?  You probably knew the answer to that already. So here's what  you can do about it.  

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Note: A spreadsheet is available upon request which allows one to calculate various sizes for apportionment of the House of Representatives using 2000 Census data. The spreadsheet uses the current statutory method (Huntington-Hill) for the calculation. It enables one to find the mathematically valid range of House sizes which do not cause various 'paradoxes'.  
Contact: dfrank_robinson@yahoo.com
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D. Frank Robinson is a former congressional candidate, affiliated with the Libertarian Party and Chair Emeritus of the Oklahoma Libertarian Party.