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Cc: Mary Lou
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2009 13:46:14 -0500
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From: Mary Lou
Subject: Lehto "high confidence/total fraud"
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4-27-09 To FEW friends from Mary Lou: This is the earlier article
tha=
t was linked in the email I just now sent to you. Some thoughts
worth con=
sidering when thinking about Holt's 2009 bill. ---ML
May 21, 2007 at 06:4=
2:50
Ultimate Nightmare for Democracy: High Confidence Yet Total Fraud
b=
y Paul Lehto
www.opednews.com
I practiced consumer fraud law for 10 ye=
ars before moving on to
election law and election fraud. I will show you =
that ALL AUDIT
PROPOSALS where the paper is generated by a computer touch =
screen
(whether DRE or Automark ballot printing devices) simply can not wo=
rk
in any way, ASSUMING that what we want is an election that matches true=
voter intent, which is what we all want.
The most critical issue with al=
l audit proposals where computers print
the ballot, is ignored by both the=
Holt supporters like Lisa Pease as
well as Holt detractors, such as Brad =
Friedman.
My biggest concern is not that the machines will print out a pap=
er
record (ballot or trail) that is different than the electronic record, =
but rather one that is the SAME as the electronic record, where BOTH
the=
paper and electronic are erroneous or fraudulent .
The reason the above s=
cenario is so very important is that when the
paper and the electronic rec=
ord match up, that means that audits will
pass with FLYING COLORS. All of=
them. The paper matches the
electronic.
We all congratulate ourselves o=
n a proper election when paper matches
electronic, right? Of course.
The =
problem is with the assumptions that go into this.
The problem assumption =
is this: We assume that "voter-verified" paper
means that voters catch mi=
stakes. BUT THIS ASSUMPTION JUST MENTIONED
IS NOT TRUE: IN FACT, VOTERS=
DO NOT CATCH MISTAKES OR FRAUDS IN THE
PAPER WHEN IT IS SECONDARY TO VOTI=
NG ON A SCREEN .
It's like at the grocery store, people sort of watch the =
cashier and
see if it makes general sense, but the secondary paper receipt=
almost
nobody checks closely. In fact its quite on the anal side or even =
weird
to sit there and study it.
Now, if the claim that I just made above=
is true, then the Holt bill
would threaten to be a further disaster for d=
emocracy because we would
have elections that (1) always pass audits with =
flying colors and (2)
are still totally fraudulent because the voters fail=
in their HR 811
"opportunity" to catch errors and approve the paper ballo=
t as printed
by the computer system for them. But surely people are more =
careful
when VOTING, right?
THIS IS NOT A CLAIM OR AN ARGUMENT, IT'S A SC=
IENTIFIC STUDY.
In one study, volunteers were required to check the paper =
trails/ballots they were given, some were correct some not. Of the
incor=
rect paper records, there were 108 incorrect paper trails.
Can you guess h=
ow many of the 108 incorrect paper ballot trails the
voters actually detec=
ted???
50? 100? Perhaps even 107 out of 108 total incorrect paper trails?=
ANSWER: The voters caught exactly ZERO of the 108 fraudulent or
irregul=
ar paper trails. 0%. Nada. Zip.
Yet it is assumed by HR 811 and all pape=
r trail/ballot auditing systems
that paper catches errors. This unexamined=
assumption is false and it
is also fatal to ALL audit proposals regardles=
s of the details or
scientific rigor of the audit proposals .
Here's Unit=
ed States Senate testimony from an MIT/Caltech elections
expert:
Each su=
bject voted three elections which contained an error and one
election whic=
h had no error. The three kinds of errors that we
inserted in the audit t=
rail were replacing the candidate the voter
voted for with a different can=
didate, removing a vote for any
candidate, and removing a whole race from =
the audit trail. In all
cases, the visual feedback that appeared on the sc=
reen and in the final
review screen of the DRE was accurate, only the audi=
t trail, either the
paper receipt or the audio feedback was inaccurate.
T=
he most startling results from our study concerned the number of
errors th=
at voters were able to identify. We noted the number of errors
that voters=
reported to us as they were voting. The numbers at each
level are quite s=
tartling. Out of 108 elections that contained errors,
14 errors were repor=
ted to us in the [audio] VVAATT audit while no
errors were reported in the=
[paper trail] VVPAT audit. In our
post-survey data 85 percent of particip=
ants agreed with the statement
that there were errors in the audio verific=
ation while only 8 percent
agreed with this statement for the paper trail=
. Almost a third of
participants actually disagreed with the statement abo=
ut errors in the
paper trail.
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/=
wps/vtp_wp31.pdf (top of
page 2) (square brackets added to explain meanin=
g of acronyms)
Yet because the paper trail or paper "ballot" printed by a=
computer is
still a VOTER-"VERIFIED" paper ballot, with high indicia of p=
erceived
reliability, it fools us all into thinking the paper trails are t=
he
"Correct" record, when voters really only pay attention to the original=
input (into the computer) not to a secondary OUTPUT (paper ballot for
re=
counts/audits per HR 811 or a paper "trail"). THus, this problem is
not pr=
esent with hand counted paper ballots where the voter votes or
reviews ONE=
time, instead of TWO as with all audit proposals that
involve printing pa=
per off of computer touch screen inputs .
Note that in the above study onl=
y 8% thought there might be a problem
with the paper even though there wer=
e 108 election problems with the
paper ballot trail, and it was repeated 1=
08 different times, and the
voters caught Zero% of the actual errors.
So =
with Holt paper ballots used for recounts or audits, the elections
can eas=
ily be a fraud, but even a whole bunch of activists think "it's
all good" =
because the voters had the chance to verify the paper, but in
fact they ba=
sically do NOT verify the paper in a way that catches
errors .
Thus, Pape=
r ballot/trails create the gold standard for voter-verified
FRAUD AND MAKE=
IT ALL SEEM LIKE IT'S A LEGITIMATE ELECTION . The
riggers are then laughi=
ng their butts off with delight at this state of
affairs, knowing that whi=
le perhaps at most 10% of errors get caught,
90% are voter approved and th=
erefore legitimated.
1. This is the new gold standard of fraud, because ev=
en if a defect in
the software is proven, there are strong arguments that =
the voter
WAIVED any such error by "approving" their printed-out ballot. G=
iven an
"opportunity to correct" whatever errors a voter "fails" to discov=
er
are highly likely to be considered WAIVED. One can waive some pretty
i=
mportant rights. For example, HR 811 supporters can properly waive
their o=
wn voting rights, but on what basis do they advocate the waiver
or comprom=
ise of everyone else's rights?
2. Computerized ballot printing systems als=
o come complete with duct
tape for the mouths of all voting activists and =
citizens who will get
laughed at for even suggesting a problem when the vo=
ters "approved" and
"verified" these paper ballot things, each and every o=
ne of them.
Whatever frauds or errors there may be are OK because the vote=
r
approved them.
Clint Curtis recently proved (unintentionally) to us tha=
t even voter
affidavits are insufficient to overcome the secret first coun=
ts.
The above fact that voters do not in fact catch errors in the paper
m=
eans that paper trails (no matter how excellently audited) can not
possibl=
y guarantee us an accurate election because it is human nature
not to pay =
attention to secondary paper, and yet that paper becomes the
gold standard=
of false confidence and voter-certified fraud. 0 for 108.
ACTION: It is n=
ot responsible to seek to change our voting systems
without seriously deal=
ing with this study. Please bring it up at every
single opportunity "audit=
s" are mentioned. I think this argument is
very solid, but at a minimum i=
t has to be dealt with by any responsible
politician, election official or=
activist.
It's OK to forward or post this email, but most important of al=
l, no
discussion of audits can possibly be responsible toward the integrit=
y
of our election without answering the question of how they can
guarante=
e that voters catch all the errors in secondary paper, when all
the eviden=
ce shows that it instead would create a sort of ultimate
nightmare for dem=
ocracy: High Confidence, Yet Total Fraud.
Paul Lehto
Juris Doctor
plehto@p=
sephos-us.org
www.psephos-us.org
=A0Paul Lehto practiced law in Washington=
State for 12 years in business
law and consumer fraud, including most rec=
ently several years in
election law, and is now a clean elections advocate=
. His forthcoming
book is tentatively titled DEFENDING (more...)
=A0The vi=
ews expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the
author
an=
d do not necessarily reflect those of this website or its editors.
--Apple-Mail-15-557769762
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/enriched;
charset=ISO-8859-1
Verdana Verdana=
4-27-09 To FEW friends from Mary Lou: This is the earlier article
that=
was linked in the email I just now sent to you. Some thoughts
worth consi=
dering when thinking about Holt's 2009 bill. ---ML
May 21, 2007 at
06:42:50
0000,0000,807FUltimate
Nigh=
tmare for Democracy: High Confidence Yet Total Fraud
<=
x-tad-bigger>by
0000,0000,EEEDPaul
Lehto
0000,0000,EEEDwww.opednews.com
ArialI
practi=
ced consumer fraud law for 10 years before moving on to election
law and el=
ection fraud. I will show you that ALL AUDIT PROPOSALS
where the paper is =
generated by a computer touch screen (whether DRE
or Automark ballot printi=
ng devices) simply can not work in any way,
ASSUMING that what we want is a=
n election that matches true voter
intent, which is what we all want.
Th=
e most critical issue with all audit proposals where computers print
the ba=
llot, is ignored by both the Holt supporters like Lisa Pease as
well as Hol=
t detractors, such as Brad Friedman.
=
My biggest concern is not that the
machines will print out a paper record (=
ballot or trail) that is
different than the electronic record, but rather o=
ne that is the SAME
as the electronic record, where BOTH the paper and ele=
ctronic are
erroneous or fraudulent .
=
The reason the above scenario is so very important is that when the
paper=
and the electronic record match up, that means that audits will
pass with =
FLYING COLORS. All of them. The paper matches the
electronic.
We all c=
ongratulate ourselves on a proper election when paper matches
electronic, r=
ight? Of course.
The problem is with the assumptions that go into this.
=
The problem assumption is this: We assume that "voter-verified" paper
me=
ans that voters catch mistakes. BUT THIS ASSUMPTION JUST MENTIONED
IS NOT=
TRUE: IN FACT, VOTERS DO NOT CATCH MISTAKES OR FRAUDS IN THE
PAPER WHEN I=
T IS SECONDARY TO VOTING ON A SCREEN .
It's like at the grocery store, p=
eople sort of watch the cashier and
see if it makes general sense, but the =
secondary paper receipt almost
nobody checks closely. In fact its quite on =
the anal side or even
weird to sit there and study it.
Now, if the claim=
that I just made above is true, then the Holt bill
would threaten to be a =
further disaster for democracy because we would
have elections that (1) alw=
ays pass audits with flying colors and (2)
are still totally fraudulent bec=
ause the voters fail in their HR 811
"opportunity" to catch errors and appr=
ove the paper ballot as printed
by the computer system for them. But surel=
y people are more careful
when VOTING, right?
THIS IS NOT A CLAIM OR AN A=
RGUMENT, IT'S A SCIENTIFIC STUDY.
<=
param>Verdana
ArialIn
one study, volunteers were require=
d to check the paper trails/ballots
they were given, some were correct some=
not. Of the incorrect paper
records, there were 108 incorrect paper trail=
s.
Can you guess how many of the 108
=
incorrect paper ballot trails the voters actually detected???
50? 100? =
Perhaps even 107 out of 108 total incorrect paper trails?
ANSWER: The v=
oters caught exactly ZERO of the 108 fraudulent or
irregular paper trails. =
0%. Nada. Zip.
Yet it is assumed b=
y HR 811 and
all paper trail/ballot auditing systems that paper catches err=
ors.
This unexamined assumption is false and it is also fatal to ALL audit
=
proposals regardless of the details or scientific rigor of the audit
propos=
als .
Here's United States Senate testimony from an MIT/Caltech elections=
expert:
Times New Roman<=
/param>Each
subject voted three elections which con=
tained an error and one
election which had no error. The three kinds of err=
ors that we
inserted in the audit trail were replacing the candidate the v=
oter
voted for with a different candidate, removing a vote for any
candidat=
e, and removing a whole race from the audit trail. In all
cases, the visual=
feedback that appeared on the screen and in the
final review screen of the=
DRE was accurate, only the audit trail,
either the paper receipt or the au=
dio feedback was inaccurate.
The most startling results from our study co=
ncerned the number of
errors that voters were able to identify. We noted th=
e number of
errors that voters reported to us as they were voting. The numb=
ers at
each level are quite startling. Out of 108 elections that
cont=
ained errors, 14 errors were reported to us in the [audio] VVAATT
audit whi=
le no errors were reported in the [paper trail] VVPAT
audit. In our =
post-survey data 85 percent of participants
agreed with the statement that =
there were errors in the audio
verification while only 8 percent agr=
eed with this statement
for the paper trail. Almost a third of parti=
cipants actually
disagreed with the statement about errors in the paper
tra=
il.
=
Arial807F,0000,807Fhttp://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/wps/vtp_wp31.pdf
(top of page 2) (square brackets
added to ex=
plain meaning of
acronyms)Ve=
rdana
ArialYet
because the paper trail or paper "ballot=
" printed by a computer is
still a VOTER-"VERIFIED" paper ballot, with high=
indicia of perceived
reliability, it fools us all into thinking the paper =
trails are the
"Correct" record, when voters really only pay attention to t=
he
original input (into the computer) not to a secondary OUTPUT (paper
ball=
ot for recounts/audits per HR 811 or a paper "trail"). THus, this
problem i=
s not present with hand counted paper ballots where the voter
votes or revi=
ews ONE time, instead of TWO as with all audit proposals
that involve print=
ing paper off of computer touch screen inputs .
Note that in the above st=
udy only 8% thought there might be a problem
with the paper even though the=
re were 108 election problems with the
paper ballot trail, and it was repea=
ted 108 different times, and the
voters caught Zero% of the actual errors.
=
So with Holt paper ballots used for recounts or audits, the elections
can=
easily be a fraud, but even a whole bunch of activists think "it's
all goo=
d" because the voters had the
chance
to verify the paper,
=
but in fact they basically do NOT
verify the paper in a way t=
hat catches
errors .
<=
bigger>Thus, Paper ballot/trails
create the gold standard f=
or voter-verified FRAUD AND MAKE IT ALL SEEM
LIKE IT'S A LEGITIMATE ELECTIO=
N . The riggers are then laughing their
butts off with delight at this stat=
e of affairs, knowing that while
perhaps at most 10% of errors get caught, =
90% are voter approved and
therefore legitimated.
1. This is the new gold standard of fraud, because even =
if a defect in
the software is proven, there are strong arguments that the =
voter
WAIVED any such error by "approving" their printed-out ballot. Given
=
an "opportunity to correct" whatever errors a voter "fails" to
discover are=
highly likely to be considered WAIVED. One can waive some
pretty important=
rights. For example, HR 811 supporters can properly
waive their own voting=
rights, but on what basis do they advocate the
waiver or compromise of eve=
ryone else's rights?
2. Computerized ballot printing systems also come co=
mplete with duct
tape for the mouths of all voting activists and citizens w=
ho will get
laughed at for even suggesting a problem when the voters "appro=
ved"
and "verified" these paper ballot things, each and every one of them.
=
Whatever frauds or errors there may be are OK because the voter
approved th=
em.
Clint Curtis recently proved (unintentionally) to us that even voter
=
affidavits are insufficient to overcome the secret first counts.
The abo=
ve fact that voters do not in fact catch errors in the paper
means that pap=
er trails (no matter how excellently audited) can not
possibly guarantee us=
an accurate election because it is human nature
not to pay attention to se=
condary paper, and yet that paper becomes
the gold standard of false confid=
ence and voter-certified fraud. 0 for
108.
ACTION: It is not responsible=
to seek to change our voting systems
without seriously dealing with this s=
tudy.
Please bring it up at every single=
opportunity "audits" are mentioned.
I=
think this argument is very
solid, but at a minimum it has to be dealt wit=
h by any responsible
politician, election official or activist.
It's OK t=
o forward or post this email, but most important of all, no
discussion of a=
udits can possibly be responsible toward the integrity
of our election with=
out answering the question of how they can
guarantee that voters catch all =
the errors in secondary paper, when
all the evidence shows that it instead =
would create a sort of ultimate
nightmare for democracy: High Confidence, Y=
et Total Fraud.
Verdana
Paul
Lehto
Juris Doctor
0=
000,0000,EEEDplehto@...
0000,0000,EEEDwww.psephos-us.org
=A0Paul
Lehto pra=
cticed law in Washington State for 12 years in business law
and consumer fr=
aud, including most recently several years in election
law, and is now a cl=
ean elections advocate. His forthcoming book is
tentatively titled DEFENDIN=
G
(0000,0000,EEEDmore...=
)
=A0VerdanaThe
views exp=
ressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the
author
and do no=
t necessarily reflect those of this website or its editors.
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