



MEMORANDUM OFFICE OF THE COUNTY MANAGER

TO: Honorable Alex Penelas, Mayor
Honorable Chairperson and Members
Board of County Commissioners

DATE: January 22, 2003

FROM: Steve Shiver
County Manager

SUBJECT: Post-Election Analysis
and Recommendations

INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that the Election of November 5th, 2002 was successful and ensured that every vote was counted. As noted by the Center for Democracy:

"Every person was allowed to vote and his or her vote counted...Miami-Dade County's overall Election effort has definitely earned that "A" for achievement."

Let me restate my position, however, that while the extraordinary effort leading up to the November Election provided essential learning opportunities, it did not establish an organizational model for a sustainable elections process. My focus is to ensure that with the proper planning and allocation of resources, conducting an election will no longer be a crisis. As I indicated throughout many of our elections task force meetings, we cannot continue to mobilize our resources to the degree that was necessary in the fall. As you know, I put a Business Management Team (BMT) in place immediately after the November Election to work on significant operational matters and planning for upcoming elections. I will continue to provide updates to the Board of County Commissioners on these issues as they become available. I especially look forward to working with our Mayor, Board, and the Elections Subcommittee Chaired by Commissioner Ferguson on election reform issues.

Over the last several months, I have provided the Governor of Florida, the Mayor and County Commission more than a dozen reports detailing our efforts to correct the problems of our September Election. I am pleased to present this comprehensive post-election report detailing the processes, expenditures and recommendations stemming from the 2002 Primary and General Elections. This report is intended to recap the events that contributed to our performance in September, to summarize our efforts toward improving the November Election, and to provide an objective perspective on our performance. Most importantly, this report and its comprehensive listing of the issues and recommendations surrounding the fall elections will lay the groundwork for creating an Elections Department – *and an election process* – that is capable of bearing the weight of our County's democratic responsibilities while not requiring the level or resources required this past cycle.

To maintain a transparent and an open dialogue with the various groups contributing to this document, the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition (the Coalition) has received a copy of this

report for their input. They will formalize their recommendations over the next week and submit them to my office. With the concurrence of the Subcommittee Chair, both this report and the Coalition's feedback will construct the agenda of the first Elections Subcommittee meeting.

It was my hope that we could have assembled the information sufficient to complete this document within December. However, we quickly learned more time was needed to ensure that we were as comprehensive as possible. The recommendations I have selected for the narrative portion of this report are what I believe to be the most critical issues and areas of concern for establishing a sustainable election process. I have also provided as part of this report a comprehensive listing of more than 300 detailed recommendations and observations (Attachment I) gathered from approximately two-dozen reports. Part of my directive to the BMT is to implement as many of these recommendations as necessary, feasible and supported by the Board. Sources include the Mayor, Board of County Commissioners, Supervisor of Elections, Audit and Management Services, the Office of the Inspector General, the Center for Democracy, the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition, the Miami-Dade Police Department, the Office of Performance Improvement, and previous reports from my office to the Mayor, Board and Governor. The listing of these sources is included as Attachment II. The remainder of this report provides more in-depth background to the September Election, summarizes our efforts leading up to November, and sets out the broad charge of the BMT.

Issues and recommendations are broken out into the following major categories in this report and these areas are also identified in Attachment I:

- Management / Oversight
- Election Day Staffing
- Training
- Voting Technology
- Communications and Support
- Polling Sites
- Vote Collection and Tabulation
- Absentee and Early Voting
- Media Relations and Voter Outreach

BACKGROUND

At the heart of democracy is a free, fair and transparent elections process. This has always been the mission of our government since the responsibility of holding elections in the state of Florida falls largely on county governments. However, a new system, new technology and new process proved extremely challenging for the Elections Department, even more than anticipated, for the Primary Election on September 10th. The County had entered a new era seemingly overnight and, like many counties, had difficulties. However, unlike other counties, our technological requirements were unique and untested by Election Systems and Software (ES&S) in a real voting environment and despite expert and staff assurances that the September Primary would be successful, efforts were insufficient.

After the September 10th Election, our employees joined me in setting in motion a process to prevent a repeat of the difficulties in anticipation of the General Election November 5th, just seven weeks away. The results of this process were unprecedented as thousands of county employees rallied and collaborated around planning, training and preparing for the General Election. These efforts proved successful beyond expectations, as the election on November 5th went off flawlessly barring some

minor, routine problems present in any large-scale election. Once again, we all owe a huge debt of gratitude to our exceptional county employees.

Our success in November could also not have been possible without the unwavering support of the Mayor, Chairperson and Members of the Board of County Commissioners. The Elections Oversight Task Force hearings that were immediately convened and held weekly in the days between the Primary and General Elections provided our staff with the critical input and adequate oversight as we developed our strategy to deal with the challenge at hand.

In addition, the community's support proved most helpful, as residents took time to learn the new voting system, review sample ballots, and very importantly, vote early. This spirit was also present in the many organizations that monitored our processes and provided crucial recommendations leading into November. Many of these recommendations were followed and are listed in this report. The Center for Democracy captured the essence of this spirit in its post-election report by stating, "the reason for this phenomenal turnaround from the September 10th Primary was the cooperation of Miami-Dade County, the Elections Department, and civil and community leaders."

In the wake of David Leahy's recent decision to enter the DROP and resign his current position as Supervisor of Elections, I appointed a team of county professionals that worked intensely on the November Election who are charged with assisting in the transition to a new Supervisor of Elections. The Elections Department Business Management Team has the responsibility for the Department's operations and planning functions until a new Supervisor of Elections is appointed.

Before I give way to the main body of the report, I must note once again the tremendous contributions of the Mayor and Board of County Commissioners, the Elections Oversight Task Force, and several key organizations and community groups, including the Center for Democracy, the Office of the Inspector General, the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition, and various faith-based groups. The success of the November Election can be credited to the supportive spirit in which our elected officials, community representatives and county family banded together. I would like to extend special appreciation to Director Alvarez of the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) and the many members of my executive staff who committed themselves to a successful November Election and to the thousands of employees who came through for us prior to and on Election Day.

EVENTS PRECEDING THE SEPTEMBER 2002 PRIMARY ELECTION

After the November 2000 Presidential Election, the Florida Legislature voted to decertify punch card voting systems. The Miami-Dade County Commission subsequently approved on January 29, 2002, a \$24.8 million contract with Elections Systems and Software (ESS) to replace its decertified voting system. The timing of this contract award allowed for a little more than six months to implement the *iVotronic* touchscreen voting technology. A lengthy State certification process compounded the already short timeline. Adding to these time constraints were a number of issues associated with the September 2002 Primary Election, including the need for approximately 200 ballot styles, trilingual voting requirements, last minute ballot wording changes, and late programming modifications to accommodate provisional ballots. Lost in the efforts was sufficient training for poll workers on the new technology and an adequate plan to deal with the excessively long *iVotronic* start-up process. In the end, the vast majority of voters who desired to vote did so, despite experiencing delays.

It should be stated that the problems encountered by Miami-Dade County, both two years ago and in September 2002, were not peculiar to our County or to our state. Close election results made Florida and Miami-Dade County the center of media attention. Both the *New York Times* and the Center for Democracy made note of this fact.

PREPARATION FOR THE NOVEMBER 2002 ELECTION

On the morning of September 11, 2002, I established a task force comprised of executive staff from my office, the Employee Relations Department, Procurement, Team Metro, General Services Administration, Audit & Management Services, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, Communications and the Office of Performance Improvement to work with the Elections Department to correct the problems we experienced prior to the November General Election. The group immediately began meeting in conjunction with staff from the Mayor's office to implement aggressive measures in an extremely short timeframe. I worked with staff to develop a detailed work plan covering all areas of the process including personnel, training and procedures, telecommunications, helps desks, logistics and set-up, media and public relations, mobile and field support, absentee voting and back-up.

On September 20, 2002, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued its report on the general inquiry into circumstances surrounding the September 10, 2002, Election. While the OIG report commended the intense multi-department efforts put in place to correct the election deficiencies, it recommended that crisis management personnel be tasked to lead our efforts. After reviewing the report, and with concurrence of our Mayor, I assigned Carlos Alvarez, Director of MDPD, to serve as the logistics manager for the upcoming election.

In a meeting conducted at MDPD Headquarters on September 21, 2002, we began the process of transitioning the countywide plans and resources already garnered to support our efforts to Director Alvarez. Mr. Alvarez assigned his Assistant Directors and Chiefs to work with other county staff to coordinate personnel, mobilization, command post operations, information and technology, election liaison, logistics & security, media relations, supplies and training. Assistant Director Frank Boni provided oversight assistance for the entire operation on a day to day basis and should be commended for his efforts as well. As Supervisor of Elections, Director David Leahy continued to perform his functions as required by law, supported by his department staff. The entire group implemented numerous reforms during a 42-day period in preparation for November 5th.

The following are key areas of emphasis that impacted our ability to deliver a successful election.

- **Personnel:** We supplemented our citizen poll workers with a 3-person County Triangle composed of a Quality Assurance Manager (QAM), Technical Support Specialist (TSS) and Verification Specialist (VS). Additionally, we established a pool of back-up personnel for dispatch in the event of no-shows on Election Day.
- **Training and Procedures:** Significant procedural revisions, such as the powering up and printing of the zero tape the day before the election, were developed and thoroughly documented. Preparing the *iVotronics* for voting the night prior to the election contributed more to the successful election than any other procedural change we made. Procedure manuals were revised to improve friendliness to the user, and both classroom and hands-on

equipment training was provided. In all, over 2,000 County Triangle members and 7,000 Poll Workers were trained on the new procedures, including specifics related to individual team member rolls. The overall team approach was fostered in all sessions.

- **Logistics:** All polling locations were surveyed in advance to ensure the appropriate electrical, phone, security and physical site considerations were addressed prior to equipment delivery. Early access to the site the day before and the morning of the election was also verified. Sixty-seven delivery trucks were deployed for early delivery of equipment. Police officer personnel integrated with the delivery and set-up process to provide security of unattended equipment. Police also retrieved equipment after the election.
- **Early Voting:** In excess of 150,000 people took advantage of absentee voting and early voting, which was provided at 14 locations two weeks in advance of the election. This effort eased Election Day congestion at the polls.
- **Help Desks and Roving Support:** A multi-tiered help desk plan was developed and implemented, including the requisite electrical, phone and technology upgrades to facilitate communications and problem resolution at the polls. Our help desk network included general public and media information, the MDPD command post, technical help desk, voter turnout, elections administration, absentee ballot information, legal help desk and precinct phones. Additionally, we outfitted 12 mobile units to make most repairs on-site and replace machines if necessary. All help desk staff were trained, while 44 were designated roving troubleshooters.
- **Contingency Plan:** As directed by the Board's Elections Oversight Task Force at the October 21, 2002 meeting, we printed substitute ballots equivalent to 25% of registered voters to provide manual backup in the event of wholesale equipment failures. These ballots were effectively implemented in one instance, when a precinct encountered technology difficulties that would have hindered its opening at 7 a.m.
- **Media Relations and Public Outreach:** Our Communications staff developed and implemented an extensive outreach campaign which included numerous daily working meetings, community activities, media discussions, use of Goodwill Ambassadors, website access, instructional videos, placement of sample ballots in print media and dissemination of in excess of 867,000 sample ballots in English/Spanish and English/Creole. The purpose of the effort was to both prepare the public for the use of the new system as well as restore voter confidence.

By nearly every measure, the November 5, 2002 General Election was a success. Every precinct opened on time (one using substitute ballots because of an issue associated with a malfunctioning master activator) and voting went smoothly. Nearly 400,000 voters successfully used the *iVotronic* machines on November 5th, in addition to the 70,000 who used the devices during early voting. The technology proved reliable during an election with a voter turnout of 53%. We did however experience some problems mostly involving flashcards and batteries. The deactivation and vote collection process was largely uneventful. The personnel, logistics and precinct support operations

all functioned well and contributed to our success.

Interestingly, more than any other single act or process modification, the decision to load the ballots the night prior to the election contributed most to November's success. Had we better anticipated the problems created by the excessively long machine activation times in September, we may not have had a perfect election, but it would have been significantly better.

In an attempt to get as much feedback as possible from those involved in the General Election, I asked the Office of Performance Improvement to conduct a series of focus groups and phone surveys and I am pleased to report those results as well. During the focus groups and telephone survey, approximately 300 participants were asked to rate the effectiveness of various components of the elections process (technology, training, etc.) on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the least effective and 5 being the most effective. The Office of Performance Improvement reported overwhelmingly positive results. Nearly all components received a score of 3.5 or above from all Election Day staff classifications. Participants gave high marks to the performance of *iVotronics* and of their poll worker colleagues on Election Day, as well as to pre-election training, polling locations, and most Help Desks.

EXPENDITURES

At the second budget hearing on September 18, 2002, we reported that the November 5th Election would cost more than budgeted and we made very clear that given the task at hand, it would be difficult to anticipate. The Board accepted the recommendation that the Countywide Contingency Fund (\$3.4 million) be held to offset the additional costs. As of this writing, the additional cost of the November 5 Election, excluding overtime expenses for the Police Department, is approximately \$2.8 million. This figure includes, among other items, unbudgeted costs for training, outreach, stipends, and overtime for County employees supporting the election. It also includes \$91,000 for the Center for Democracy and \$454,000 for additional services received from ES&S. In total, the additional costs can be covered fully by the available contingency funds. Federal funds made available to the State through the Help America Vote Act will also be pursued.

In addition, the Police Department has identified a cost of \$2.1 million for approximately 47,500 hours of overtime attributable to the November 5th Election. Some of the overtime cost could be offset by using a portion of the overtime appropriation in the Police Department which is budgeted at \$24.8 million for this fiscal year. A portion of this amount is budgeted for unanticipated events and would be an appropriate use of funds. Although assuring a well-run election was no less a priority for this community than responding to a natural disaster or other emergency, a commitment was made that the use of our police force for the elections would not hinder normal police operations. Therefore, I am recommending that the balance of the Contingency Fund and other available reserves be used to cover the police overtime costs, even though some of the overtime costs could be considered as allocated within our current police budget. We will include, as part of the mid-year budget amendment, recommendations to adjust the budgets for the Police and Elections Departments to account for the additional costs.

When considering the cost of the November 5th Election, especially the overtime police costs, it must be remembered that plans were developed in a constricted timeframe between September 11th and November 5th. In addition, the directive by the Mayor and Board was to assure a successful election.

As such, decisions to use additional officers were made in an overabundance of caution. As a result, costs for the election were higher than would be expected in the future when we have additional planning time and the knowledge learned from November 5th. Nevertheless, it is evident that countywide elections will cost significantly more than in previous years.

ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Elections Department lacked the foresight needed to be prepared for any complications a new, revolutionary voting technology might bring, and as a result they were not expecting equipment problems, nor did they invest resources appropriately in training people or in “game-day” preparation. Our short-term strategy to fix the problems of September was resource intensive. As noted earlier, for each category that follows there are various supporting recommendations. Rather than list all of the recommendations, I describe the issues broadly in the following paragraphs. The BMT is already working to address many of these recommendations. In addition to these items, I have reviewed the comments and guidance provided by the Elections Oversight Task Force in providing directives to the BMT. Foremost on this list are outreach and education, ADA accessibility issues, contingency plans for planning efforts and election day, accurate vote tabulation procedures, simplified voting machine opening and closing procedures, and the creation of a completely transparent process that gives every citizen the assurance that there are no impediments to vote and that every vote will be counted.

The Elections Department BMT has a two-fold responsibility. First, it will assist the Supervisor of Elections in ensuring that upcoming elections are run with the same high degree of success achieved in November. This will require significant attention to calculating and meeting deadlines associated with a number of municipal elections. Second, it will create a sustainable model for Miami-Dade County elections. In this regard, it will define success by restructuring and retooling the Elections Department, by revising and updating major election processes and information systems, and by establishing the appropriate level of ongoing support to be provided by county departments in such areas as training, logistics and Election Day personnel. The goal will be to conduct successful elections that are free from the need for continuing MDPD involvement and that have, to the extent possible, limited county personnel presence in the polling places.

In establishing the election model of the future, I expect the BMT to research how other governmental entities around the state and the nation who employ similar voting technology align their organizations and major processes. I have instructed the Supervisor of Elections and the BMT to develop the schedule of how we transition from our present operation to the future model, with the goal of having a system in place that is fully tested and prepared for the General Election of 2004.

The remainder of this report summarizes by category some of the lessons learned in recent months and defines the challenges facing us during our transition.

Management / Oversight

From discussions I have had with staff and a review of the various reports stemming from the fall elections, it has become evident that the Elections Department requires a new organizational structure which revolves around the requirements of a technology-based election process. The Center for Democracy’s report was clear on this matter. A critical feature of the department’s overhaul will be the augmentation of its management ranks. The

department must clearly focus on its efforts to train and recruit poll workers; to improve election day support and logistics; to better inventory, prepare and maintain voting equipment; to manage its technical and information systems; and to improve its procurement and accounting functions. The demands of a modern election, the increase in registered voters and municipalities, and new election laws have overwhelmed the Elections Department. These requirements attest to the need of a restructured Department and the creation of several new management positions and an increased staff size. To be ready for Fall and Spring Elections, staff recruitment for new positions will begin in the current year. This will result in additional costs that I will recommend as part of the mid-year budget amendment. The Center for Democracy emphasized reorganization in their report and this is extremely important to the future success of the department.

After working closely with the Supervisor of Elections this fall, I learned first-hand of the incredible range of demands placed upon the staff within the department. A new organizational structure and a balanced management team will allow a new Supervisor to focus on the elements critical to success and to discontinue a dependency on the Police Department and others for the support functions they performed during the General Election. I anticipate that the overhaul of the department and the elections process will be phased in over the next twelve months.

As stated earlier in this report, I have appointed a BMT to assist transitioning the department to a new management structure in anticipation of a new Supervisor of Elections. I would like to stress once again that the future management model will emphasize elections that are staffed with as many citizen volunteers as possible. It will include centralized support in the areas of training and logistics, and possibly information technology, along with a scaled-back presence of county personnel in polling locations. With advice from the Mayor and the Board, we will continue to work with community groups as part of our outreach efforts.

Election Day Staffing

In addition to the Election Board, a County "Triangle" was put in place for the November Election. The Triangle consisted of a Quality Assurance Manager, a Technical Support Specialist, and a Verification Specialist. In a series of focus groups held subsequent to the November election, precinct workers gave overall positive marks to the staffing plan. Concerns were commonly voiced about the sometimes unclear delineation of responsibilities between the Clerk and Quality Assurance Manager, and about the performance of a small number of Clerks and Inspectors. Overall, however, the County Triangle and the Election Board worked well together. Particularly high marks were given to the Technical Support Specialists.

Although the November Election proved successful, the staffing strategy involving the county Triangle was an extraordinary one requiring over 3,000 employees to participate in various capacities. While we must remain committed to ensuring that future elections are as successful as those we experienced in November, I am not convinced that such a heavy involvement of county employees on a long-term, continuing basis is our best course. I am tasking the BMT with developing a staffing strategy for future elections that ensures quality workers in the polling locations and sufficient logistics, help desk support and stand-by

workers, but that scales back the overwhelming dependency on County employees. Precincts of the future must have at a minimum a Clerk that is tested and competent to carry out all polling site procedures, and a technical specialist who is trained, tested and possibly certified in dealing with all the problems common to an automated voting environment. The Technical Specialists will come largely from county ranks. For this critical position, we will not be dependent on volunteers or an external vendor.

Many options exist that can provide polling locations with trained and qualified workers. In the future, we may seek to partner with the private sector or the school system to obtain Election Day workers who are more accustomed to working in an automated environment. Consequently, we will re-examine our recruitment strategy and compensation schedule for poll workers. Through a combination of increasing experience and improved training and recruitment, we should be able to reduce the number of government employees in the polling locations. As discussed during the Elections Oversight Task Force meetings, we will also emphasize skill testing and assigning workers based on language capabilities. Our current databases tracking this information are no longer adequate and require significant modifications or possibly replacement.

Training

By now, everyone is very aware of the training deficiencies that existed prior to the September 10, 2002 election. The quality of the instruction and the number of training hours were not appropriate for a large-scale deployment of new technology. We need to make considerable improvements in our training and testing program for election workers. Manuals will be better organized, content will be made consistent, and check lists will be clear. The Center for Democracy report stressed that poll workers were at all times helpful to voters at all polling places they visited. We have a good base to build upon.

According to focus groups conducted subsequent to the November Election, the training and manuals, though imperfect, were an improvement on earlier versions and allowed members of the County Triangle and Election Board to perform their duties adequately. We will design a staffing and training plan that reflects clear lines of authority and responsibility. Future training may explore the possibility of training poll workers with their Election Day teams and in a more interactive environment. We should consider adding an element of computer-based training, exploring the possibility of establishing a poll worker certification process, and identifying more appropriate training facilities, possibly in conjunction with establishing improved warehouse facilities.

Training will be conducted in a language-sensitive manner as requested by the inquiries of the U.S. Department of Justice. Specifically, this training will include special instructions for Spanish and Creole-speaking poll workers.

Quality Assurance Managers expressed the importance of ensuring consistent application of procedures involving voter affirmation forms and provisional and substitute balloting. This important priority coincides perfectly with the guidance given to us by the Elections Oversight Task Force and at the request of the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition. Training and written materials in these areas need to be improved and more heavily stressed.

In addition, many focus group and survey respondents indicated that they would prefer smaller classes and more hands-on training with the *iVotronics*. I anticipate that the Employee Relations Department will continue to be the primary provider of training. I do not believe that a large, full-time Elections training staff will be a necessity.

The emphasis of all training is to ensure that NO VOTER IS TURNED AWAY.

Voting Technology

Overall, poll workers we spoke with were pleased with the performance of the *iVotronics* during the November 5, 2002 Election. Most felt that the vast majority of voters were able to effectively use the devices. No systematic failures were noted, though there were scattered instances of *iVotronic* and activator device trouble, missing or inoperable flashcards, and machine calibration problems. Other minor issues were reported in some polling places, but most technical problems were resolved in a manner that did not significantly impede the ability of voters to vote.

The most significant concerns centered on the extended length of time required loading machines with the ballot, particularly the audio units that commonly took over an hour to prepare. Workers also were displeased with the performance of the audio machines when used by the sight-impaired. The machines had a poor audio menu and no visible screen so that voters could be adequately assisted. Success rates for the use of these devices by the sight-impaired were not acceptable. The audio portion needs fine-tuning and would benefit from an additional set of headphones and a visible screen.

ES&S is testing a new start-up procedure that may allow many *iVotronic* devices to be activated simultaneously. The new process could bring the time required for loading ballots at a typical polling place with ten machines to under an hour. This is a significant reduction from the average time of nearly four hours as experienced during the November 2002 election. The new software changes will be thoroughly tested and certified by the state before being implemented.

Many options have been suggested for future elections concerning preparing the *iVotronics* for Election Day. Suggestions have been made to activate the ballots at the warehouse before shipping, or simply to arrive earlier the day of the election to activate the machines. Each solution, including the process used in November, has its own risks and benefits. As ES&S improves the start-up procedures and we gain more confidence and experience with *iVotronics*, I believe we will eventually load the ballots on Election Day.

Communications and Support

Communications between the polling sites and various support functions worked adequately during the November Election. In addition to traditional land lines, Quality Assurance Managers were able to relay information to their support functions through Nextel phone messaging, roving technical support and police officers who were stationed outside the polling locations. Help desk support was substantially increased for the last election. Help desks were separately established to provide technical support for voting equipment related calls, general election rules and procedures, voter eligibility, absentee ballot and legal

questions. In addition to the technical support help desk, our help desk network included general public, media information lines and voter turnout lines. MDPD established a command post for logistics and staffing support and for any law enforcement-related issues arising during the elections.

Generally, focus group and phone survey respondents gave overall favorable ratings to the help desk system. The technical support desk received the most positive comments, while the command post and the Elections desk workers were thought to not be sufficiently knowledgeable. Poll workers complained of being repeatedly transferred and of receiving inconsistent information. For the November Election, we outfitted 12 mobile units to make on-site repairs and to replace machines as necessary, trained 44 roving trouble shooters, and pre-positioned standby poll workers around the County. Focus groups participants and survey respondents expressed concerns regarding the timeliness of logistical and personnel support. It was also evident that the centralized staff providing technical assistance requires more training than time allowed for this past fall. The command post for future elections will focus less on coordinating logistics (these calls will go to the logistics providers) and more on the primary activities of the polling place.

Of particular concern to Quality Assurance Managers was the use of Nextel communications device messaging capabilities. In the future, I anticipate Nextels will be used exclusively for emergency centralized message dispatching and as back-up phones. It may be possible to connect the laptops currently used by Verification Specialists to a wireless network using Nextel wireless cards. This would allow for real-time updates of early voting information and messaging. The job performance of the Verification Specialist would be greatly enhanced by the ability to provide timely, accurate and automated information concerning early voting. If wireless laptops are not implemented by the next major election, we need to find another means of improving the timeliness of information provided to Verification Specialists regarding early voting.

Several audit reports have identified issues related to our warehousing, equipment tracking, supplies and quality control. We will address these very valid concerns as part of our transition plan. Decisions we make on warehouse space and training facilities will take into account our new warehousing and equipment tracking policies.

Polling Sites

General elections in Miami-Dade County require the establishment of over 700 precincts, which in the last elections were located in 553 separate facilities throughout the County. Pre-election polling site assessments include checks of phone and electrical systems and of accessibility for persons with disabilities. Many sites are not optimal for voting locations, some because of their accessibility, small size or because they are open-air, and others are problematic because they are in operating schools and high-traffic areas. Many lack adequate parking. State law now requires the County to survey sites for compliance with ADA legislation and to make all sites accessible to people with disabilities by July 2004. We will continue to work with General Services Administration to meet the requirements of this law.

Maintaining an adequate base of suitable voting sites is a constant struggle. We may explore

certain options involving the school system, including timing major elections with school closures, using more school sites, and recruiting more teachers as poll workers. These ideas would require the concurrence of the Board of County Commissioners, the state legislature and the School Board.

Vote Collection and Tabulation

As part of Audit and Management's post-election audit, I anticipate a series of valuable recommendations concerning our vote collection and tabulation process. I am aware that as a residual of shifting to a new voting technology, we use two separate automated systems for vote tabulation and reconciliation. We will migrate to a single system over time. As discussed in the Media section of this report, we will also continue to allow greater access to our process by allowing a camera in the tabulation room.

Absentee and Early Voting

For the November General Election, voters made great use of absentee ballots and early voting sites. Approximately 45,000 people voted by mail and 70,000 at early voting sites. This represented over 20 percent of the total votes cast in the general election. We will continue to educate voters on these voting methods to relieve system stress on Election Day. Based on early voting patterns, we are likely to make significant adjustments. We plan to employ more locations than the current 14 and adjust hours to optimize availability. We will take into account the need to turn around machines, prepare precincts, and provide updated precinct register information to polls on Election Day as we develop future early voting schedules.

Media Relations and Voter Outreach

Our voter outreach efforts were considerable and effective prior to both the September Primary and the November General Election. Voters came to the polls prepared and with a working knowledge of both the new equipment and the issues presented on the ballot. This was accomplished through a focused educational plan. The Elections Department made presentations to citizen groups around the County, providing voting demonstrations and information concerning registration, absentee ballots and early voting. Voting machines were placed in high-traffic areas including shopping malls, city halls, Team Metro offices and Community Action Agency facilities. The Communications Department produced and distributed educational videos and the county website was updated to allow citizens to learn how to vote with the new equipment on-line. Multilingual sample ballots were mailed to postal customers and published in local newspapers and periodicals.

We are committed to improving upon this proactive approach to outreach. Sample ballots in three languages will continue to be produced with the well-received "Frequently Asked Questions" information. For large elections, sample ballots will be mailed to all households in three languages.

We also spent significant resources updating the media of our efforts to improve our voting processes for the November Election. In addition to periodic news conferences, we distributed media releases and gave greater access than ever before to the members of the media. The Communications Department established a news media room in the Stephen P.

Clark Center and installed a camera in the Elections Department's tabulation room. Other major elections will reflect a similar degree of outreach.

This program must expand to educate the public on voter rights and responsibilities. Program expansion would emphasize the right to vote provisionally, voter choices such as early and absentee voting, voter assistance requirements and voter responsibilities. To ensure effectiveness, such a program may be coupled with strong voter registration drives. We look forward to strengthening our relationships with community groups to educate the public on our voting process. Input will be sought from groups representative of all communities with a careful focus on language barriers, minorities and special populations.

There is little doubt that the September 10, 2002 Primary Election was an embarrassment and despite repeated assurances from staff that we were prepared, it was apparent that we were not. However, this has given us the opportunity to re-invent our elections process and take advantage of other resources within the Miami-Dade County organization as well as the many citizens groups that made this a success.

I appreciate the opportunity to provide this report to you and look forward to working with Commissioner Ferguson and the other members of the Elections Subcommittee as requested to implement and move forward with our Election Reform efforts.

c: Honorable Joseph P. Farina, Chief Judge, Eleventh Judicial Court
Honorable Harvey Ruvin, Clerk of Court
Honorable Bennett Brummer, Public Defender
Honorable Katherine Fernandez-Rundle, State Attorney
Robert Ginsburg, County Attorney
County Manager's Staff
Department Directors
Kay Sullivan, Clerk of the Board
Robert Meyers, Executive Director, Commission on Ethics and Public Trust
Chris Mazzella, Inspector General
Eric McAndrew, Chief Legislative Analyst

Attachments

Attachment I
Miami-Dade County
Summary of Report Findings
Fall 2002 Elections

Category	Issue/Concern	Recommendation	Reference
PEOPLE: Management / Oversight			
<i>Overall organizational structure</i>	a. Elections management needs to be transferred back to Elections Department	a. Develop implementation plan and timeline for transition of elections function to Department and Election's Board by next election in 2003; liaise with Association of Elections Supervisors; conduct focus groups of persons who worked the November 5 elections	COD2
	b. ITD and Systems Development Division of Elections must cooperate	b. Eliminate duplication of effort; define roles and divide task appropriately	COD2
	c. Time constraints and urgency of November 5 elections warrants treating the event as crisis situation	c. Involve Police and Miami-Dade Emergency Management Office to lead solution effort	OIG
	d. Clerks are not empowered	d. Empower clerks (the Boss) to make on the spot decisions	OIG
	e. Lack of sufficient Creole-speaking skills in Election Department	e. Ensure that department has appropriate employees with English-Creole skills and that additional individuals with Creole-speaking skills are available during elections	MDERC
	f. Staff resources stretched for November 5 Election	f. Overhaul elections process and structure to eliminate need for large County employee participation	CMR9
<i>Police involvement</i>	a. Decision to involve Police Department in elections process resulted in role reversals and friction – Elections Department being directed instead of directing the elections	a. No direct recommendation was offered except that police (city, state and County) should not wear identifying uniforms or insignia in polling places during election hours	COD1
	b. Community groups with strained police relations distrust police involvement	b. Increase visibility of Miami-Dade Emergency Management in electoral process; increase public presence of Elections Department Staff; step up public information campaign; consider joint press conference (Mayor, Manager, Police and Elections) prior to Election Day to show partnership and cooperation; provide forum to hear and address stakeholders' concerns	COD1
	c. Presence of "Deputy Sheriffs" at precincts can be intimidating to voters	c. Discontinue practice or change titles	COD2
	d. MDPD should not manage future elections	d. Assign ACM to oversee transition of elections management; increase funding to Elections Department.	MDPD
	e. County Triangle was unaware of police role	e. Train County triangle members on MDPD roles and responsibilities	MDPD
	f. Planning for November 5 th Election in short time frame following September 10 th Primary was very complex	f. Task Chief of Police as special project manager to lead planning and logistics	CMR3
<i>Elections Department structure</i>	a. Problem resolution delayed due lack of authority given to contracted ESS personnel	a. --	AMS3
	b. Current department structure and organization is not suitable to administering a well-run election	b. Appoint Business Management Team to realign departmental operations, structure and administration	CMR10
	c. Staffing levels are insufficient	c. Establish, fund and fill additional positions	MDE

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<i>Audit / oversight function</i>	a. Lack of citizen involvement in elections process	a. Create citizen's board of elections to provide oversight and make recommendations	MDERC
	b. Elections' small administrative staff results in lack of appropriate controls between procurement and accounts payable functions	b. Reorganize staff, adding new positions if necessary, to ensure proper procurement and accounts payable controls	ACCT
	c. Department does not keep list or aging reports of outstanding invoices	c. List invoices by hand until minimal invoicing tracking database can be implemented	ACCT
	d. ADPICS purchasing system is not used	d. Train staff in ADPICS and require usage.	ACCT
	e. Checks received from candidates and/or individuals are not promptly deposited	e. Deposit checks promptly	ACCT
	f. Lack of FAMIS index codes showing department had prepared or submitted necessary billings to municipalities or other organizations	f. Improve tracking of all reimbursable elections and send billings promptly	ACCT
	g. Purchased capital equipment not sufficiently tracked or documented	g. Hire capital equipment inventory clerk	ACCT
<i>Election observers</i>	a. Observers not fully appreciated by County	a. Clarify role of observers to poll workers and county staff; convey information concerning credentials needed for access to polling place	COD1
	b. Increased stress on poll workers due to election scrutiny	b. Limit observers allowed at each site	AMS3
<i>Other</i>	a. The November 5 th elections were expensive – among highest cost per voter nationwide	a. Train Assistant Clerk to do Verification Specialist's job; eliminate Quality Assurance Manager; increase skill level of Election Board staff; review elections remuneration for County employees; recruit poll workers from schools (teachers and students)	COD2
	b. County Attorney's Office not appropriately included in electoral process	b. Establish separate phone bank staffed by County Attorney's Office to respond to questions related to eligibility, registration etc.	OIG
	c. Elections Department assumed entire role of system implementation	c. County Manager and CIO should assume greater role.	AMS3
	d. Accurate State voter registration roll	d. Work closely with the State regarding accurate purging of voter rolls	MDERC
	e. Voting rights for individuals convicted of felony	e. Work closely with State to ensure timely information updates so those who have had their voting rights reinstated may register to vote	MDERC

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	i. Time period between October Opa-Locka election and General Election was insufficient to prepare comprehensive ballot, so voters used two separate booths to vote	f. Accurately calculate deadlines by which municipal elections must occur in order to accommodate programming needs for general election	MDERC
	g. Concern regarding voter turnout	g. Continue early voting; study feasibility of Election Day voter registration; increase voter registration campaigns	MDERC
	h. Large voter turnout may exacerbate problems at polling places	h. Expand and promote Early Voting availability and promote its use	CMR6
	i. Time period between October Opa-Locka election and General Election was insufficient to prepare comprehensive ballot, so voters used two separate booths to vote	i. -	CMR7
PEOPLE: Election Day Staffing			
<i>Recruitment</i>	a. Recruitment and training effort for future elections should be sustained	a. Transition recruitment and training function to Elections; maintain active list of professional trainers to develop curriculum and training manuals; focus on poll workers with requisite technical and administrative expertise; enhance recruitment of high school seniors	COD2
	b. Abilities of volunteer poll workers and level of no-shows are of concern	b. Consider closing schools on Election Day to increase available pool of poll workers; assess conditions leading to no-shows; revisit recruitment process and devise alternate strategies; prohibit anyone who has not completed training from working the polls	COD2
	c. Poll worker compensation	c. Explore creative ways to attract civic-minded citizens to volunteers	OIG
	d. Clerks and Assistant Clerks recruited from traditional sources had difficulty adapting to new equipment	d. Recruit County staff to supplement precinct staff	AMS2
	e. Quality of poll worker performance	e. Recruit County staff to augment precinct staffing; increase poll worker accountability by tracking attendance and performance.	AMS2
	f. Inappropriate staff assigned for duty; inadequate opportunity for department review of poll worker assignments	f. Recruit County workers on volunteer basis, with department review	CIO
	g. Not all employees recruited were sufficiently qualified	g. Department Directors should select qualified personnel, especially for TSS role	MDPD
	h. -	h. Improve recruitment of qualified citizen workers	OPI
	i. Current skill level of poll workers not yet sufficient for setting-up, activating, troubleshooting, and closing Ivotronics.	i. Augment poll workers with County support (QAM, TSS and VS)	CMR4
	j. Many poll workers recruited to work during September 10 th Primary arrived late or did not show up for work	j. Ensure sufficient contingency of backup poll workers by recruiting county employees; use county Intranet site to inform employees about Election Day assignments; use phone bank to ensure all poll workers are aware of Election Day assignments and reporting times	CMR5; CMR8; CMR9
	k. --	k. Conduct recruitment drives among major businesses; encourage businesses to grant days off with pay for volunteer poll worker duty	MDE

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<i>Assignments</i>	a. Combined voting and administrative responsibilities are too much for one person	a. Separate voting machine systems functions from administrative functions	OIG
	b. Some poll workers assigned precincts far from their homes	b. Use GIS system to place employee poll workers close to their homes	CIO; OPI
	c. Family members working together created appearance of compromised election process	c. Do not allow family members to work at same precinct	MDPD
	d. In some heavily Hispanic and Haitian precincts, there was inadequate bilingual staff	d. Ensure adequate numbers of bilingual staff as needed	OPI; MDERC
	e. County used a "heavy handed" approach to training and job assignments	e. Improve internal communications to county employees regarding Election Day assignments and training and convey greater confidence in staff's professionalism	OPI
<i>Staff size</i>	a. TSS had little to do during voting hours	a. Review Triangle functions to determine appropriate staffing levels and roles	CIO; OPI
	b. Many precincts were overstaffed	b. Review Triangle functions to determine appropriate staffing levels and roles	OPI
<i>County Triangle</i>	a. The triangle is important for its technical and administrative expertise	a. Retain the County triangle	COD2
	b. QAMs and TSSs were not used in Oct. 1 st elections	b. Oct. 1 st election should have been used to test and refine concept prior to Nov. 5 th implementation	AMS3
	c. QAT was successful on November 5 th	c. Retain QAT; make election duty a permanent employee responsibility	MDPD
	d. Lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities of QAM and Clerk caused tension in some precincts	d. Clarify roles and responsibilities of Election Board and County employees; provide list of typical situations that could occur on Election Day and who is required to act	OPI
	e. In busy precincts, Verification Specialists did not get a break since no other staff had been trained on laptop	e. Cross train County employees to provide relief coverage and to minimize idle time	OPI
	f. Concern exists regarding staffing Triangle positions (QAM, TSS, and VS) exclusively with County employees	f. Reproduce Triangle for future elections, but use non-employees for at least 2 of the 3 positions and pay them sufficiently to attract people with needed skills	MDERC
	g. Elections have become legally, procedurally and technologically more difficult to conduct	g. Continue to use County employees to fill VS and TSS positions; train Clerks to perform QAM's job; have County QAMs evaluate performance of Precinct Clerks during November 5 election to identify qualified individuals	MDE
<i>Employees</i>	a. Reluctant County workers did not appear for assignments in special elections of October 22, 2002	a. Take strong steps to insure all staff report for duty as assigned	COD1
	b. Utilizing County employees was very successful and ensured a smooth election process	b. --	OPI
<i>Citizens</i>	a. Citizen volunteers difficult to manage	a. Use only County employees for elections duty	MDPD
	b. Performance of Clerks varied considerably	b. Consider using County employees as Clerks	OPI
<i>Back-up poll workers</i>	a. Arrival of back-up personnel was not at all timely	a. -	OPI
	b. --	b. Continue to utilize County employees as standby poll workers	MDE
<i>Compensation</i>	a. Poll worker compensation	a. Review compensation; recommend increases for volunteers	OIG
	b. Compensation levels are too low to attract competent staff	b. Consider increasing levels to attract greater numbers of quality personnel	AMS1

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	c. Compensation is too low	c. Increase compensation to minimum of \$100 per day; compensate citizen volunteers for time spent in training	MDE
<i>Other</i>	a. Lack of technical expertise for troubleshooting Ivotronics and for responding to Help Desk questions	a. Leverage vendor to provide personnel to work as rovers and to man help desks	CMR6
PEOPLE: Training			
<i>Scheduling</i>	a. Training occurs only close to election days	a. Offer classes routinely instead of only around elections	COD2
	b. Communication gaps led to scheduling problems	b. Use single entity to coordinate training and scheduling	MDPD
	c. Number of training hours provided prior to the September 10 th Primary was insufficient	c. Increase number of training hours and require September 10 th Primary workers to be retrained prior to working on November 5 th ; offer refresher training to all County and citizen poll workers	CMR5; CMR8
<i>Materials</i>	a. Many had difficulty finding information quickly	a. Improve election manual layout; include visual aids; describe and include sample forms; review and improve checklists and responsibilities; improve font size (elderly poll workers) and include quick reference guide; revise manual to incorporate lessons learned from elections experience	COD2
	b. Training materials are unsatisfactory, not readable and unclear	b. Review training materials, group by responsibility; improve organization of package; plan ahead; include other languages aside from English	COD2
	c. Training manuals were comprehensive and useful, but poorly organized and paginated; "Absentee Ballot Site Training and User's Guide" used during early/absentee voting was less useful	c. Reorganize, clearly paginate, index and tab training manuals; distribute manuals in advance	OIG
	d. No means for poll workers to study independently	d. Implement computer/video based training modules; post training manuals on Internet as well as Intranet; notify poll workers via e-mail when procedures and/or manuals have been updated	MDPD; CIO; OPI
	e. Manuals lacked visual aids	e. Add graphics, flowcharts, etc. to training manuals	MDPD; OPI
	f. Elections manual/handbook needs revision	f. The handbook was re-written after the September 10 th Primary and includes specific job descriptions for all poll workers and the County Triangle	CMR5
<i>Curriculum</i>	a. Some elections staff did not know how to handle surrendered absentee ballots	a. Include process in the training curriculum	COD2

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	b. County lacks vision concerning poll worker organizational structure	b. Develop concise table of organization and include in training curriculum for poll workers; define and clarify poll worker roles; modify training commensurate with organizational structure and responsibilities; provide minimum of 4 hours training prior to elections and 3 hours of hands-on simulation for VSS	OIG
	c. Misunderstanding of staff roles	c. Ensure volunteer staff is cognizant of County personnel and outsider roles	AMS3
	d. Poll workers did not understand media policy	d. Emphasize media policy to poll workers and media personnel prior to Nov. 5th election	AMS3
	e. Training lengths for clerks varied from 4-12 hours	e. Augment training for Clerks, QC managers and IT Techs with 8 hours hands-on instruction and 2-3 hour refresher course for poll workers	AMS2
	f. Poll workers' adherence to procedures and duties is inconsistent	f. Training should place additional emphasis on completion of forms and usage of reference tools	AMS1
	g. Instance of affirmation form not completed prior to change of address at precinct 236/313	g. Stress importance of procedural adherence during training	AMS1
	h. Elections procedures related to Ivotronic machines not clearly defined prior to training	h. Clearly define procedures well in advance of training	CIO
	i. Insufficient training emphasis on voter rights, provisional ballots, and ensuring voters are in the correct precinct	i. Increase training regarding voter rights such as voter identification requirements, change of address, and assistance; improve training on helping voters at the wrong precinct and informing voters that provisional balloting only works when they are in the correct precinct	MDERC
	j. Training in substitute ballots only given to QA Managers	j. Ensure that training in substitute ballots be given to all poll workers	MDERC
	k. Training successfully prepared most poll workers for Election Day duties; Quality Assurance Manager training was insufficient for effectively backing up Technical Support Specialist and Verification Specialist	k. Provide additional training for QAMs regarding TSS and VS responsibilities	OPI

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	l. Insufficient time "hands on" with IvoTronics for QAT and Clerks	l. Provide additional time for hands on training for QAT and Clerks/Assistant Clerks	OPI
	m. -	m. Training activities and manuals should be more interactive and include more "What-if" scenarios and solutions	OPI
	n. Not all poll workers followed correct procedures for assisting voters.	n. Emphasize procedures regarding voter assistance during training	OPI
<i>Instruction</i>	a. -	a. Require all County trainers to conduct elections training	MDPD
<i>Class format</i>	a. Training was vastly improved but could be improved further	a. Reduce class size; offer shorter sessions spaced out over a longer period	COD2
	b. Difficult to identify absences, since no initial roster was provided to trainer	b. Provide class roster to trainers	MDPD
	c. Class sizes were too large for optimal learning	c. Reduce class size	MDPD; OPI
	d. Significant time wasted during IvoTronics instruction.	d. Design hands-on training to minimize idle time while waiting turn on the IvoTronics. For example, place units on student's tables to allow small group observation of procedures	OPI
	e. -	e. Conduct joint training of QAM, Clerk to clarify roles & boost rapport	OPI
	f. --	f. Maintain number of training hours required for November 5 election (8 hours for Clerks, TSS, VS; 4 hours for Inspectors; 2 hours for Poll Deputies)	MDE
<i>Testing / Demonstration of competency</i>	a. There may be a need for a nucleus of election professionals that can be relied upon for future elections	a. Consider introducing regular professional training program for Election Board complete with certification	COD2; MDE
	b. Take home study and examinations are ineffective	b. There should be no take home examinations; poll workers must demonstrate their proficiency prior to conclusion of training	OIG
	c.	c. Testing during training should be "closed-book" and graded by trainers, with results being made part of the public record	MDERC
<i>Other</i>	a. Training effort was decentralized.	a. Create full time Elections training staff (15-20 positions)	MDPD
	b. -	b. Conduct survey of poll workers to obtain feedback on training	MDERC
	c. Training provided for September 10 th Primary was inadequate, especially given introduction of new technology for Election	c. ERD was tasked with developing new and expanded training program that included hands-on training with the IvoTronics	CMR1
	d. Inadequate space for training	d. Acquire permanent, fully equipped, sufficiently large elections training facility	MDE
	e. --	e. Conduct training during non-peak election periods; require certification every two-years; require certified individuals to attend two-hour refresher courses prior to working in an election; contract with ERD to conduct certification training and refresher training prior to major elections; Elections Department should conduct refresher training prior to small-scale elections and VSS training	MDE

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Category	Issue/Concern	Recommendation	Reference
PEOPLE: Media Relations			
<i>Media outreach</i>	a. Main themes of media campaign and mass mailings are not firmly imprinted through these detailed material sources	a. Transform data into "sound bites" to reflect two main themes –1, No voter will be turned away and 2, When you push the red button, your vote is already counted	COD1
	b. Some target audiences may need more attention to minimize confusion in voting and understanding difference between sample versus actual ballots	b. Tailor processes to elderly to minimize confusion between sample and actual ballots; include precinct name and location on sample ballot; target outreach for disabled voters and elderly to appropriate neighborhoods; provide demonstration units in areas frequented by public; consider mock elections to familiarize voters; seek input from different community groups	COD2
	c. Communication gaps between Elections, Communications and MDPD Media Relations Bureau	c. Appoint media relations liaison in Elections Department	MDPD
	d. Improve media relations	d. Provide media with workroom in SPCC on Election Day	CMR8
	e. --	e. Continue to install camera in tabulation room and provide news media room at Elections Department facility during elections expected to garner national attention (e.g. 2004 presidential election)	MDE
PEOPLE: Voter Outreach			
<i>Pre-election voter education</i>	a. Too many voters walked away without pressing red button	a. Improve machine design and voter education	COD2
	b. Sample ballots mailed were generic	b. Mail specific sample ballots	COD2
	c. Unprepared voters can hinder election process	c. Use PSAs and pamphlets to educate voters	MDPD
	d. Public was not sufficiently educated about new voting machines prior to September 10 th Primary	d. Establish outreach program, including mailed sample ballots, fact sheets, training videos, meetings with community organizations, Internet updates, media advertising; target additional outreach to neighborhoods that experienced problems during September 10 th Primary; work with community groups interested in sending large groups of people to Early Voting to ensure voting is smooth	CMR4,6,7,8
	e. Voter outreach prior to November 5 election proved effective	e. Maintain ongoing voter education program	MDE
<i>On-site demonstrations</i>	a. Given time constraints voters may need additional I votronic training	a. Mandate that voters use demonstration machine prior to voting	OIG

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<i>(Votronics, flip charts, etc.)</i>	b. Demonstration units were very useful for orienting voters	b. --	OPI
<i>Sample ballots</i>	a. Sample ballots were useful in educating voters	a. Continue to use sample ballots	MDPD
	b. Ballots in separate languages not consolidated	b. Trilingual sample ballots should be consolidated and be sent in single mailing to home	MDERC; MDE
	c. Cost of mailing and publishing sample ballots is high	c. Establish consistent policy on sample ballots; if costs prohibit both mailing and publishing sample ballots, mail samples to every household; monitor action State Legislature on this issue	MDE
	d. "Frequently Asked Questions" section on sample ballots was useful	d. Continue to include FAQs on sample ballots	MDE
	e. Sample ballots included all races and candidates Countywide, leading to confusion for some voters	e. If possible, customize sample ballots so that voters only receive candidates and races they are eligible to vote on	MDE
<i>Other</i>	a. Need for additional outreach to more voters with disabilities	a. Loan machines to organizations serving the disabled for voter outreach; provide training to key staff at key centers	COD2
	b. Inconsistent procedures for working with representatives of community organizations regarding elections and voter education	b. Standardize procedures for working with representatives of community groups; ensure access to necessary meetings; continue BCC meetings of Elections Oversight Task Force as long as necessary	MDERC
PLACES: Polling Sites			
<i>Appropriateness of Space</i>	a. Number and availability of more suitable polling places	a. Consider closing schools on Election Day	COD2
	b. Some polling sites located inside schools with classes in session	b. Consider closing schools on Election Day	COD2
	c. Some sites not large enough to provide adequate accommodations.	c. Negotiate to have sites with appropriate space and facilities to accommodate the elections process	COD2
	d. Inclement weather could affect voting at outdoor sites; excessive heat was uncomfortable for poll workers and caused machines to shut down	d. Select alternate indoor voting locations	MDPD; OPI
	e. Not all voting sites were problem-free	e. Elections Department should conduct site survey of all polling locations	MDPD

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	f. Fire stations were inappropriate sites due to inadequate parking, voters' blocking of emergency vehicles, potential for theft of equipment and medical supplies, prohibition against police presence on site	f. Discontinue use of fire stations as polling places	MDFR
	g. Lack of awareness and coordination between poll workers and polling place contacts regarding 50-foot perimeter	g. Ensure that poll workers and polling place contact are aware of how the 50-foot perimeter rule applies to polling place and resolve any problems regarding the perimeter before Election Day	MDERC
	h. Most polling locations were suitable, although some sites were too small	h. --	OPI
	i. At some polling places, Ivotronics were stored overnight in closets that were not appropriately temperature controlled	i. Consider climate / temperature requirements for Ivotronics	OPI
	j. --	j. At school sites, ensure that students are appropriately separated from the polling place.	OPI
	k. Several polling places used during the September 10 th Primary were not appropriate for conducting an election, especially with the Ivotronics	k. GSA conducted assessment of all polling places prior to November 5 to ensure location was appropriate, and ensured access for overnight set-up	CMR1
	l. --	l. Make checking electrical outlets part of the standard polling place facility assessment process	MDE
	m. State law requires the County to conduct a survey of polling places for accessibility to people with disabilities by September 1, 2003. All polling places must be accessible by July 1, 2004, although variances for some polling places may be granted until 2006.	m. Fund additional permanent Elections Field Technician to assist in this work.	MDE
<i>Layout</i>	a. -	a. Improve polling place layout and lighting to accommodate machines and power cords; use floor plans on file with Elections Department	OPI
<i>Accessibility</i>	a. Conflict between site managers and County Elections Department	a. Consider closing schools on Election Day; ensure site managers have all pertinent information on site use schedules, including previous day setup and logistical requirements (lights, A/C, etc.)	COD2
	b. Lack of appropriate signage at some precincts; 50-foot campaign free line inadequately marked	b. Place appropriate signage and clearly mark 50-foot zone	COD2
	c. Not all sites were accessible to the disabled or persons with mobility challenges	c. Work with disability organizations and senior groups to ensure main entrances to these sites are accessible and convenient to these voters	COD2

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	d. Site at precinct 236/313 not wheelchair accessible	d. Department should confirm accessibility prior to election. Construct portable wooden ramps for temporary usage at sites lacking wheel chair accessibility	AMS1
	e. -	e. Ensure ADA compliance (ramps, appropriately sized tables for wheelchairs, etc.)	OPI
<i>Safety</i>	a. Some locations featured raised platforms or stages that posed safety risks, especially for elderly voters	a. Ensure safety of polling sites	OPI
<i>Other</i>	a. Need for complete audit of elections sites	a. Audit all elections sites for accessibility for elderly and disabled; include input from precinct clerks; establish new pool of election sites with appropriate facilities and a listing of contact persons	COD2
	b. At some locations, voting took place in rooms other than those identified by the County	b. --	OPI

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PROCESSES: Election Procedures			
<i>Ballot security / integrity</i>	a. PEBs and Flash Cards not securely kept at the Elections Department	a. Take steps to secure PEBs and Flash Cards away from even limited public access	COD1
	b. When used for curbside or lap top voting, machines have no privacy screens	b. Correct this design flaw	COD2
	c. Ballot security can be enhanced	c. Exercise better control of red ballot authorization slips; ensure inspectors collect slip from voters and treat them as secure election materials; assign two additional persons to accompany TSS to collection center (preferably from two opposite political parties); Election Board should ensure all machine counts are downloaded by reconciling number of signatures in register to machine count	COD2
	d. Voting machines locked at precinct overnight	d. Control procedures to track location and utilization of devices; add task to "Checklist Before Polls Open".	AMS1
	e. Lawsuit challenging ballot results	e. Elections Department should prepare for possibility of lawsuit challenging tabulation process where ballots are recounted from Ivotronic machines	AMS1
	f. Controls ensuring all votes are counted	f. Improve controls including reconciling sign-ins and ballot variation forms collected (early voting) with the actual number of votes cast	MDERC
<i>Determination of voter eligibility</i>	a. Returned voter identification cards for voters who moved out of County were not processed in timely manner before elections	a. Immediately process all returned voter identification and develop procedures for updating records and notifying precinct clerks to remove these names from register	COD1
	b. Poll workers at precinct 236/313 determined eligibility before offering machine demo	b. Offer demonstrations prior to determining eligibility; provide Creole-speaking poll workers at precincts with significant need	AMS1
<i>Provisional ballots</i>	a. Inconsistent understanding of use of provisional ballots	a. Develop detailed written provisional ballot procedures on processing, evaluating and counting; remind public and constituency groups that provisional ballots are available and that no one will be turned away	COD1
	b. Lack of procedure of notifying voters of their polling locations in advance of elections	b. Publicize information on how to identify a voter's proper polling place	COD1
	c. Tactic to supplement provisional ballot supply with substitute ballots is confusing to public	c. Remind public and constituency groups that provisional ballots are available and that no one will be turned away	COD1

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	d. Public perception that provisional ballots will never be counted	d. Include assurances in public outreach programs	COD1
	e. Concern about turning voters away	e. Stress use of provisional ballots in training	CMR9
<i>Absentee ballots</i>	a. Absentee ballots are not being kept securely in the Supervisor's office	a. Implement formal security procedures to limit personnel and access to ballots and Elections Department as a whole; sensitive materials must be locked and taken to work area only as needed	COD1
	b. Inadequate security procedures to receive and file sensitive documents	b. Implement formal procedures for receipt, filing, storage and handling of sensitive material	COD1
	c. Ballots can be inadvertently returned to voter	c. Include Elections office return address on return area of the absentee envelope	COD2
	d. Current rules dictate that voters cannot drop-off absentee ballots at precinct	d. Implement mechanism to allow precinct to accept absentee ballots	COD2
	e. Accessibility of absentee ballot opportunities	e. Open absentee ballot locations on weekend before election in at least one polling place per Commission district	OIG
	f. -	f. Emphasize proper use and acceptance of absentee ballots during poll worker training	AMS2
	g. Poll workers not clear on absentee ballot written procedures	g. Provide adequate guidelines in Absentee Ballot procedures for ballot delivery	AMS1
	h. Cost of mailing an absentee ballot was not clearly marked	h. Clearly display cost of returning absentee ballot on envelope	MDERC
	i. Absentee ballots are not in trilingual format	i. Convert absentee ballots to trilingual format	MDERC
	j. Number of absentee ballot requests expected to rise to 100,000 or more for 2004 presidential election	j. Secure minimum of ten PCs to process additional requests	MDE
<i>Back-up (substitute) ballots</i>	a. Need for clarity in use of substitute ballots and for "back-up" for Supervisor of Elections	a. Designate County Manager as back-up to Supervisor of Election to authorize use of substitute ballots; inform voters of purpose and use of substitute ballots	COD1
<i>Other</i>	a. Poll workers are unclear as to whether voting results can be shared with observers	a. Advise all poll workers that observers are entitled to copy results after download from voting machine	COD2
	b. Lack of procedural consistency	b. Ensure staff adherence to protocol affecting polling place procedures	AMS3
	c. Technical inconsistencies between Palmetto Bay and N. Miami with regards to programming and data backup	c. Data backup should be performed at precinct	AMS3

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Category	Issue/Concern	Recommendation	Reference
	d. Elections Department did not plan to backup and reserve Ivotronic votes	d. Implement backup process to external media (CD's) for extended time period; system vendor to complete modifications for data-backup to flash memory	AMS1
	e. Data for Sept. 10th election will be lost if not backed-up to storage medium	e. Backup all data to another storage medium such as CD's	AMS1
	f. Increased procedural violations due to system of low wage workers	f. Assignment of Quality Assurance manager and IT Tech to augment precinct staff; remedial training to encourage compliance and appraise Clerk performance; change color of voter authorization slips; additional tasks added to Verification Specialist responsibility; reassess poll worker compensation	AMS1
	g. Dual election caused unnecessary strain	g. Avoid scheduling municipal elections concurrently with general election	MDPD
	h. Paper ballots at polling places are not in trilingual format	h. Ensure that all types of paper ballots are in trilingual format	MDERC
	i. Concern that there are not sufficient backup procedures in place	i. Ensure continued availability of backup machines and paper ballots on Election Day	MDERC
	j. Prison inmates eligible to vote unaware of procedures for voting absentee	j. Elections department should contact Corrections Department to provide education related to absentee procedures	MDERC
	k. Curbside voting did not go well in all precincts; elderly voters had difficulty reading the screen with glare from the sun, and machines were heavy for some voters	k. -	OPI
	l. -	l. Provide "proof" of voting, e.g. receipts, "I voted" stickers	OPI

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PROCESSES: Early Voting Procedures			
	a. Public misunderstanding of difference between early and absentee voting	a. Publicly emphasize convenience of early voting and urge voters who received absentee ballots to return them by election day	COD1
	b. Increased risks for using I votronics in early voting for September 10th election.	b. Data should be read, collected and backed up daily to decrease security risks. Paper provisional ballots should be available as a contingency measure	AMS2
	c. During early voting, when a person voted this was entered in a computer; if computers were down, workers could not enter this information and the person could conceivably vote twice	c. --	OPI
	d. During early voting, machines were set up from various precincts at one location. Some precincts were busier than others at that location, so there was a line to use certain machines while others were unused	d. Double number of I votronics at all Early Voting sites over November 2002 levels	OPI
	e. Toward the end of early voting, many polling places were understaffed	e. Ensure adequate staffing levels throughout early voting	OPI
	f. Early voting workers were not assigned specific jobs	f. Clarify roles and responsibilities of early voting personnel; assign Quality Assurance Manager to each early voting site	OPI; MDE
	g. -	g. Assign well-trained Elections staff to work at early voting sites	OPI
	h. Activities at municipal government sites disrupted the voting process; security and access issues	h. Use only County facilities for Early Voting	MDPD; MDE
	i. Lists of last-minute early voters are not sent to precincts in time	i. Ensure lists of early voters arrive at precincts by 6:30 a.m.; improve procedures regarding how lists are processed on Election Day	MDERC
	j. Concern that increased postage rates for absentee ballots could disenfranchise voters	j. Continue to allow voters to drop off absentee ballots at early voting sites	MDE
	k. Popularity of early voting sites led to long wait times	k. Double number of early voting sites for 2004 countywide elections	MDE
	l. Many voters mistakenly believed early voting sites would remain open until 7:00 p.m. on November 4, rather than 4:00 p.m.; County employees assigned to early voting were also assigned to work at polling places on November 4; I votronics used during early voting not available for use on Election Day	l. End early voting on the Saturday prior to Election Day to minimize voter confusion and staffing problems; use I votronics used in early voting as back-up machines on Election Day	MDE

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PROCESSES: Logistics / Supply Management			
<i>Polling place set-up</i>	a. First ballots cast after 7:00am opening at some precincts	a. Use GSA staff to perform setup and testing day before election	AMS2
	b. Voter's Bill of Rights was not posted at a polling site	b. Precinct Clerk should ensure all signs are posted	AMS1
	c. Opening and closing procedures went smoothly. Previous night set-up was seen as key to success	c. Continue to activate machines the night before an election until opening times are significantly reduced by vendor	OPI, MDE
	d. In a few precincts, phones were located in another room	d. --	OPI
	e. Some phone lines did not function	e. GSA should check closer to election whether phone lines work	OPI
	f. There is not sufficient time to set up the Ivotronics the morning of an election	f. Machine set-up should occur on the day before the election.	CMR4,5
	g. Overnight set-up of machines introduces security risk	g. Use police to guard polling place until morning of election	CMR7, MDE
<i>Equipment testing</i>	a. Activation and testing all machines the day before elections was not done at all precincts	a. Activate and test all machines the day before an election to minimize last minute troubleshooting	AMS3, MDE
	b. Malfunctioning equipment was distributed to polling sites; some machines were missing flashcards or needed new flashcards	b. Improve warehouse quality control procedures	CIO, OPI

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Warehousing (inc. pick-up and return)	a. Chaotic and haphazard storage logistics; equipment not readily identifiable; overcrowding	a. Acquire new and additional warehouse space	OIG
	b. Duplication of effort for machine pickup; lack of staff awareness regarding resolution to problem	b. Changes in procedure should be communicated to all staff promptly	AMS3
	c. Inadequate storage and labeling of voting equipment pre- and post- election	c. Implement quality control procedures to track equipment	MDPD
	d. Collection points were inadequately staffed and lacked sufficient trucks	d. Increase staffing and trucks at collection points	MDPD
	e. -	e. Have two people at most return to distribution center, or transmit votes electronically from a wireless laptop	OPI
	f. Warehouse inventory tracking is limited	f. Upgrade current inventory tracking system; use database to track Ivotes, their targeted precincts, and transport routes	WRH
	g. Limited warehousing space makes equipment storage and staging for elections difficult	g. Obtain larger warehouse and additional bays for trucks; consolidate warehousing space and Elections administrative in single building; visit warehouses in other jurisdictions that use Ivotes (ESS has access)	WRH
	h. Current machine testing area is not suitable	h. Testing area should be in room adjacent to warehousing space. Testing area should be secured and have air conditioning	WRH
	i. Recruitment of temporary staff for warehouse is done on-site by word of mouth and without background checks	i. Begin recruitment of temporary staff sooner before an election to provide more time to assess employees and perform background checks	WRH
	j. Current dedicated positions for warehouse are not sufficient	j. Add three new positions for warehouse: Warehouse Office Manager, Inventory/Supply Manager, and Technical Equipment Warehouse Manager	WRH
	k. Physical distance between Elections Department offices and warehouse impedes interaction	k. Identify facility where elections offices and warehouse can be co-located	MDE
	l. Return of all Ivotes on election night requires significant County resources	l. Should County decide not to return all Ivotes on election night, have Clerk and Assistant Clerk transport one of two results tapes to Collection Center as a back-up to results bag transported by TSS; place seals on Ivotes that are left at polling sites	MDE
	m. Inadequate staffing	m. Fund new Elections Department positions: one professional Warehouse Manager, one Equipment Preparation and Maintenance Supervisor; five Election Equipment Preparation and Maintenance Technicians; one Election Support Specialist	MDE

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Category	Issue/Concern	Recommendation	Reference
<i>Distribution of supplies</i>	a. Distribution of communications pack four days prior to election results in risk of loss, tampering, etc.	a. Reconsider existing policy	AMS1
	b. Easy availability of supplies or replacement parts/machines is critical	b. Provide equipment rovers with backup supplies.	
	c. Delivering machines is logistical challenge	c. Create routing plans, obtain delivery trucks, recruit drivers from County workforce and set up staging areas	CMR8
	d. Given the number of Ivotronics used for November 5 election, early voting and training, there was a shortage of Ivotronics available for rovers	d. Acquire additional Ivotronics to ensure rovers are adequately equipped to replace failing machines on Election Day	WRH
	e. Previous process of delivering voting equipment and supplies from Monday - Thursday on week before election worked smoothly	e. Re-implement this process. Place seals on each Ivo-tronic to prevent tampering	MDE
	f. Police officers delivered substitute ballots to all precincts on the night before November 5 election	f. Have staff pick up substitute ballots at distribution center prior to election	MDE
<i>Security</i>	a. Lack of appropriate physical security during Opa-Locka tabulation	a. Dept. should maintain heightened awareness of security issues	AMS1
<i>Other</i>	a. Chain of custody, equipment safeguarding, and physical controls require improvement	a. Maximize use of County facilities as precincts for greater control; partner with MDCPS and business community for better site identification; clarify role of public safety officials transporting activator cases to tabulation centers; test phone lines and electrical service night before elections; assign control numbers to equipment	AMS2
	b. Insufficient staff were available 11/4 to program flash cards	b. Improve procedure / staffing for programming flash cards	MDPD
	c. Decentralization of precinct, poll worker assignment, supply and logistics management	c. Use centralized Command Post to coordinate all November 5 Election logistics	CMR7
PROCESSES: Return of Results / Vote Tabulation			
	a. Need for review of training documents concerning formal documentation and counting of absentee and provisional ballots	a. Revise formal process for accounting and review of each ballot; define steps and rules for determining eligibility of each vote and for security and storage procedures	COD1
	b. Reliability of Unity Reporting software	b. Pretest entire tabulation process prior to close of election day	AMS3
	c. Lack of paper trails, analysis of post-election results and backup procedures; more effort required by the Elections Department to assure system process integrity	c. Enhance training to emphasize importance of backup procedures; numerically sequence optical scanned ballots for better control; numerically control and account for flash cards; have TSS transport sealed cases, flash cards, and zero-tape results to regional collection centers; provide additional training for collection supervisors to improve understanding of procedures.	AMS2
	d. Lack of feedback system during tabulation process	d. --	AMS1

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	e. Elections Department did not generate report detailing overvotes and under votes	e. Review preprogrammed report for indication of system or poll worker error	AMS1
	f. Inadequate space for tabulation of absentee ballots	f. Secure additional, secure space	
PROCESSES: State legislation			
	a. 50-foot campaign free line seems inadequate (too close to precinct)	a. Lobby for increase to at least 100 feet from precinct	COD2
TOOLS: Voting Technology			
<i>Regular Ivotronics (several observations are common to all machine types)</i>	a. Font size not adjustable for individuals with low vision	a. Provide equipment with adjustable font size	COD2
	b. Ballot loading speed is too slow and machines are not poll worker friendly	b. Upgrade machines for faster loading and increased user-friendliness; use faster and more capable chips to allow loading to be less than one minute even for long ballots in three languages	COD2
	c. Ballot loading procedure is time consuming and expensive	c. If upgrading machines is not immediate, consider loading machines at warehouse	COD2
	d. Several equipment related improvements are needed	d. Provide on-screen notice when machine is operating on battery power and minutes remaining on load; create system that prevents PEB from being removed before machine loading is completed; improve process for resetting machines (paper clip); implement alternative methods for testing accuracy of PEBS and machines in general; seek alternative to collecting all votes on single PEB for auditing purposes	COD2
	e. Human error frequently blamed for machine malfunction is not all true	e. Perform complete Election Day simulation on the machines (startup through closing) under varying scenarios and using different PEBs	OIG
	f. Batteries prematurely lost power at precinct 134	f. Incorporate voltage check into activation process; train Technical support to monitor machine voltage	AMS3
	g. Last minute changes and modifications to machines created negative consequences	g. Utilize comprehensive test plan prior to election for entire electoral process; carefully consider and test all modifications prior to implementation	AMS2
	h. System design did not allow for appropriate incorporation of messages, edits, controls, self- diagnostics and minimizing voter confusion	h. Use red PEB as only activator; Ivotronic alarm for voter inactivity should activate after one minute; assess ESS performance for breach of contract and seek appropriate remedies.	AMS2
	i. Operational errors leading to equipment malfunctions that were not properly documented	i. Test equipment the night before field delivery; develop procedures to document malfunctions of all equipment; develop Ivotronic touch screen calibration procedures and schedules; remind poll workers and logistical personnel to take care when handling and deploying machine	AMS2
	j. In general, Ivotronics functioned properly on November 5	j. —	OPI

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Category	Issue/Concern	Recommendation	Reference
	k. Design flaws in Ivotronics cause users to remove PEBs too soon during loading	k. Reconfigure Ivotronics loading process	MDPD; OPI
	l. Incorrect error messages (e.g. "battery low" message for dirty infrared window)	l. Request vendor to improve accuracy of error messages and/or include "tricks" in training manuals; include battery level on splash screen	CIO; OPI
	m. Some machines were calibrated incorrectly	m. --	OPI
	n. User-friendliness of Ivotronic could be improved	n. Place "Help" button on screen to tell voter what to do next (i.e. review the ballot, go to the next page, etc.); provide more space between choices, especially on inspector screen, to minimize inspector errors when selecting precincts or, during primary elections, parties	OPI
	o. Several Ivotronics did not work properly during the September 10 primary because of power/battery failures, poor calibration, and incorrectly installed flashcards	o. Create new positions (QAM and TSS) and enhance training to ensure Ivotronics work properly on Election Day	CMR1
	p. Initial plan to expedite set-up time by making software changes prior to November 5 Election	p. Making change to such an important procedure late in the process was deemed too risky	CMR5
	q. Precincts were not provided with spare flash cards in November election	q. Provide two extra flash cards for each polling place and train TSS on procedure for replacing flash cards	MDE

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Category	Issue/Concern	Recommendation	Reference
<i>Audio I votronics</i>	a. Equipment difficult to load and very sensitive	a. Use installation shortcut to load ADA machine; make machine more robust and reliable	COD2
	b. Inaccurate estimated loading time caused users to prematurely remove master PEB	b. Improve loading time for ADA unit; inform poll workers of accurate loading times in advance	CIO
	c. ADA units were rarely used	c. Place only one ADA unit per precinct	CIO
	d. Numerous problems with audio units including lengthy opening and activation times, shutdowns, difficulty with navigation, and failure to read ballot exclusively in selected language	d. Leave screen visible during audio voting; include second pair of headphones for voters' assistants; increase user-friendliness of navigation; allow Technical Support Specialists to use audio bypass method to reduce opening time	OPI
	e. Activation time for audio-Ivotronics is very lengthy	e. Vendor technicians were able to use a different procedure on November 5 to activate audio Ivotronics more quickly in 33 precincts on November 5th	CMR9
<i>Demo unit</i>	a. Equipment is very sensitive	a. Make machine more robust and reliable	COD2
	b. A few units shut down and had to be reactivated	b. Utilize videos for demonstrations	OPI
<i>PEBs</i>	a. In general, PEBs worked well	a. --	OPI
	b. Numerous Blue Master PEB failures during opening and closing procedures	b. Request vendor to correct problems with Blue Master PEB; monitor issue during upcoming elections	CIO
<i>Opening/Closing procedures</i>	a. Poll workers unable to activate machines in time allotted	a. Segregate technical and administrative duties. Use County personnel with technical expertise	AMS2
	b. Inventory of voting machines not required in opening procedures	b. Inventory machines at close of polls.	AMS1
	c. Late changes in procedures prior to September 10 primary not sufficiently communicated to poll workers; poll workers did not follow opening and closing procedures during September 10 Primary	c. Elections made last minute phone calls to precincts and trained Backup Specialists	CMR1
	d. Some Ivotronics could not be closed during November election	d. Establish procedure for TSS to transport any Ivotronics that cannot be closed on election night directly to the Stephen P. Clark Center along with the results bag	MDE
<i>Other</i>	a. Lack of general awareness and check of equipment calibration	a. Complete test vote on every machine after set up	COD2
	b. Inadequate common knowledge of the battery backup	b. Review battery problems encountered; determine backup battery life under different circumstances; provide additional backup battery; determine times to fully charge a battery	OIG

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	c. Additional, spare equipment, of all types, not available for Opa-Locka election	c. Spare equipment should be readily accessible and available to be deployed	AMS1
	d. Lack of security measures for all machines (Ivotronics, laptops, etc.)	d. Test communications network prior to Sept. 10th election; implement password security with dual user sign- in on optical scan device and laptop, virus protection for Ivotronic, PEB's and voting machines	AMS1
	e. Calibration of Ivotronics	e. Take steps regarding improper calibration including improving voter education and poll worker training, collecting calibration-related information from other jurisdictions, continuing to work with the vendor to reduce calibration problems, and conducting in-house technical research about calibration	MDERC
	f. Time to load flashcards with ballot information is time-consuming (two full days to load all flash cards)	f. --	CMR6

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TOOLS: Elections Communications & Support			
<i>VS laptop</i>	a. Lack of interactive capability	a. Network VS laptops to allow real time exchange of data including late absentee/early voting info, changes of address/name, troubleshooting via e-mail	OPI, MDE
<i>Transmission of early voting data to precinct</i>	a. Late absentee ballot and early voting information was outdated and in many cases updates were not received until late in the day	a. If legal, end early voting prior to eve of election to allow for accurate information on Election Day; or network laptops to allow real time data exchange	OPI
<i>Nextel Phones and "In Command" system</i>	a. Usefulness of NEXTEL phones on November 5 was very limited	a. If NEXTELS are used in the future, they should have no messages and be used as back-up phones, two-way to other precincts, and for central broadcasting as necessary	OPI; MDE
	b. Communicating with precincts during the September 10 primary was difficult	b. Use Nextel 2-way messaging to provide immediate instructions / reminders to all precincts at once and to facilitate GIS mapping with color-codes indicating precinct status	CMR7,9
	c. Multiple systems used to track precinct status during November election; time lag between update of application and calls in to the MDPD CP when polls closed	c. Use single application to track all issues; consider single command post combining functions in the future to eliminate any disconnect in communication between each CP.	MDPD
	d. --	d. Incorporate procedures in "In Command" that were put in place towards the end of the election process, such as Regions by Assistant County Manager	MDPD
	e. --	e. Provide capability to produce audit reports from "In Command" on-screen and on paper, such as which precincts have not responded to an automatic message	MDPD
<i>Help Desks</i>	a. Help desks in many cases do not have answers to questions and concerns	a. Staff help desks with qualified and informed personnel; reduce hold times.	OIG
	b. Most callers could get through to Help Desks, but were often transferred multiple times or had to wait hours for response	b. Implement extensive training program for select County staff designated to work on Help Desks; assign ESS project manager to develop program; train people answering phones to deal with issues instead of transferring calls; assign each precinct one liaison/troubleshooter to be single point of contact	AMS3; MDE; OPI
	c. Help Desk calls managed manually	c. Implement automated problem tracking system and/or electronic message board	CIO
	d. Multiple numbers for different Help Desks	d. Utilize single phone number and trunk system to manage calls	CIO
	e. Elections Help Desk closed November 4; yet many elections questions went to Technical Help Desk	e. Open Elections Help Desk on November 4	CIO
	f. High rate of abandoned calls for Elections main number, Poll Workers Hotline and MDPD Operations	f. Use historical data from 2002 to staff Help Desks appropriately	CIO
	g. Insufficient number of Help Desk lines for September 10 Primary	g. CIO/ITD augmented number of lines for November 5 th Election	CIO

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	h. Configuration and varying types of help desks were confusing and contributed to some desks being overloaded on September 10	h. Categorize calls to Technical Support Desk in terms of complexity and route as needed on November 5; simplify number of calling points but improve routing of calls	CIO
	i. Problem definition at Technical Help Desk Level 1 (used for simpler issues) was often inadequate, causing inefficiencies for Help Desk Level 2 support	i. Improve staff selection and training for Technical Help Desk Level 1	CIO
	j. County Triangle not adequately trained on Help Desk protocol, leading to unnecessary hang-ups and call-backs	j. Train QAT on Help Desk protocol; post precinct address and telephone number next to all precinct phones and at Help Desks so information is readily available	MDPD; CIO
	k. Technical Help Desk received generally favorable comments in focus groups, while Command Post and Elections desk were thought not to be as knowledgeable; Legal was rarely used, but was responsive and accurate	k. --	OPI
	l. Help Desks provided inconsistent direction at times, especially during early voting, when procedures changed as Election Day drew closer	l. --	OPI
	m. Technical Help Desk was overwhelmed by logistical issues	m. Add logistics help desk; route requests for equipment and supplies directly to elections warehouse	OPI; MDE
<i>TSS Rovers/Trouble Trucks</i>	a. Rovers did not have clear job instructions other than to "roam around"	a. Clarify rover duties; reassess needed staffing levels; equip rovers with cell phone and car allowance	CIO
	b. Rovers worked extreme hours (e.g. pre-election duty until 2:00 a.m. Tuesday and reporting again at 4:30 a.m.)	b. Consider multiple shifts for rovers	CIO
	c. Size of rovers' zones varied widely	c. Review zone and precinct assignments	CIO
	d. Rovers did not have list of precinct addresses or staff	d. Provide rovers with map showing all precincts within zone and precinct staff list with contact information	CIO
	e. TSS rovers received no additional training	e. Improve rover effectiveness by providing additional training	CIO
	f. Trouble trucks did not handle telephone malfunctions	f. Clarify responsibility for telephone malfunctions	CIO
	g. Insufficient trouble trucks to support roving technicians	g. Increase number of trouble trucks with supplies of commonly malfunctioning items such as flash cards and PEBs (1 truck for every 25 polling places); equip roving technicians with supplies	MDPD; CIO; OPI; MDE
<i>Other</i>	a. More technical support from CIO needed	a. CIO Should play a greater role in elections process	AMS2
	b. Need for consultant to assess controls, risks, and viability of hardware and software options	b. Develop strategic operations / readiness plan	AMS2
	c. Need for enhanced support for software security, management, security, etc.	c. County information technology resources should be dedicated to providing support	AMS2
	d. Poll worker assignments made through multiple databases	d. Develop single database to track poll worker training, skills and assignments	MDPD
	e. Difficult to track payroll through manual system	e. Install wireless network at all precincts to allow real time payroll entries and other support	MDPD

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	n. --	n. Continue to establish Command Post for all major elections, but use Command Post to monitor overall process, rather than responding to individual requests for supplies, equipment or personnel	MDE
	o. GIS mapping system was excellent means of monitoring elections	o. Continue to use GIS	MDE
	p. Reverse-911 system of contacting poll workers was not well received	p. Secure sufficient staff to contact poll workers personally prior to elections	MDE